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Abstract 
This case study analyzes how the Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS) 
program managed complexity.  The MGS is one of the ten variants of the Stryker 
series of vehicles that equip the Army’s Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.  These 
brigades were created by the Army Chief of Staff (from 1999–2003), General Eric 
Shinseki, to provide the Army with a highly deployable medium-force capability.  
Initially intended as a variant that required limited development, the MGS 
experienced a number of significant challenges during systems development.   
This case study uses one of the program’s primary issues, reliability shortfalls 
with the ammunition handling system, to describe how the program self-organized to 
manage complexity.  The case study identifies the elements of complexity that 
existed in the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), and how they interacted to create 
a challenging situation for the MGS program.   
After a crisis period from 2004–2005, the MGS program changed its 
acquisition approach through the revitalization of systems engineering and risk 
management.  This case study examines the self-organizing methods that the MGS 
program used to improve system performance, and it concludes with a description of 
how acquisition programs can better align their acquisition strategy to achieve 
programmatic resilience.  
Keywords: Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Interim Force, Mobile Gun 
System, Complexity, Uncertainty, Systems Engineering, Reliability, Risk 
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I. Introduction 
A. Diyala Province, 2008 
The platoon sergeant from Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry 
Regiment had thoroughly prepared his Mobile Gun System (MGS) platoon for their 
reconnaissance mission in the Diyala Province, an area northeast of Baghdad that 
was a hotbed of insurgent activity.  With over 19 years in the Army, the platoon 
sergeant understood the process of preparing Soldiers for a mission (known as 
Troop Leading Procedures), and he was aware of the potential problems that could 
easily arise in such a complex environment.  The Army trains its tactical leaders to 
integrate the Troop Leading Procedures as early as possible in the planning process 
and to maximize the use of time. 
The platoon’s mission from their higher headquarters was to “get eyes on” a 
small town in their sector by using the sophisticated array of day and night optics on 
the MGS (see Figure 1) (Pappalardo, 2008, March 11).  To visualize the battlefield, 
the platoon sergeant used the limited amount of information that he had on the 
enemy and the three-dimensional terrain to build situational understanding for the 
platoon, but he knew that this picture was imperfect.  While moving to their 
observation point, the platoon sergeant’s MGS was struck by an improvised 
explosive device (IED) “that blew out eight tires and one antenna mount” (2008, 
March 11).  Although the tremendous blast jarred the crew, they were able to 
execute one of their contingency plans and move the vehicle to a secure area 2600 
meters away to execute their preplanned battle damage and repair procedures 
(2008, March 11).   
During mission planning, the MGS platoon leadership identified hazards and 
developed controls to mitigate those risks in a process known as risk management 
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process requires situational understanding and controls that the platoon’s leadership 
adapts to the particular hazard and situation (2005, November 20, p. E-1).   
 
Figure 1. M-1128 MGS  
(GDLS, 2005c, slide 2) 
Soon after they conducted the battle damage and assessment drill and 
brought the vehicle to an operational status, the platoon got back onto the road.  
Within minutes of getting the platoon back onto the road, a second IED struck the 
platoon sergeant’s vehicle (Pappalardo, 2008, March 11).  This time, the crew’s 
gunner was able to identify “the triggerman on the roof of a building 820 feet away” 
and with no tires or communications equipment, the platoon sergeant’s vehicle was 
able to “engage the spotter with 20 rounds [7.62mm machine gun], while on the 
move to eliminate the threat” (2008, March 11).  Despite two IED strikes, the platoon 
maintained its resiliency in the face of uncertainty and completed its mission without 
the loss of life.   
Risks are an inherent part of any mission, and the platoon was able to 
complete its mission because its leaders properly anticipated these risks and 
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the platoon sergeant demonstrated the integration of risk management and 
knowledge management into his Troop Leading Procedures.  The synchronization of 
these processes was critical to his platoon’s ability to accomplish the mission without 
the loss of life.  Yet, the synchronization of these processes required the application 
of the platoon sergeant’s will and an understanding of battle command.     
B. Systems Acquisition: A Complex and Uncertain Mission 
Just as the tactical leader in the Diyala vignette had to synchronize 
processes, the program manager must synchronize his or her program in time and 
space to achieve effective results while navigating a complex and uncertain defense 
acquisition system.  Just as the MGS platoon sergeant synchronized risk 
management and knowledge management into his Troop Leading Procedures, the 
program manager must do the same to exercise resilient and agile program 
management.  The program manager must also work with imperfect information 
while making decisions on development, testing, production, and logistical support 
that will affect the program over its entire lifecycle.   
The Mobile Gun System, one of the ten variants of the Stryker series of 
vehicles, conducted its first operational deployment to Iraq as part of the 4th Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division in 2007.  During its first operational 
deployment to Iraq, the MGS received positive feedback. In the words of the platoon 
sergeant from the Diyala vignette, “it is the most lethal ground vehicle for an urban 
environment in Iraq today” (Pappalardo, 2008, March 11).  However, the vehicle 
experienced a challenging development process.     
C. Research Question and Methodology 
1. Research Question 
This case study had one primary research question: How did the Mobile Gun 
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primary research question, the researcher developed several supporting research 
questions: 
 What was a significant developmental problem experienced by MGS 
that required the MGS program to revise its approach? 
 What was the root cause of the developmental problem, and what 
corrective actions did the program management office take to improve 
the system? 
 What is complexity theory, and how does it apply to products and 
systems? 
 How did the MGS PMO self-organize to adapt to the complex 
environment, and what insights can the case study use to apply to 
other systems acquisition programs?  
2. Methodology 
This case study focused on the program’s first six years of development from 
2000–2006, granting the case study a historical perspective.  The case study used a 
specific issue encountered during the MGS development as a means to study how 
complexity affected one particular systems acquisition program.  The case study 
then identified the methods, techniques, and approaches that the MGS Product 
Management Office (MGS PMO) and the prime contractor, General Dynamics Land 
Systems (GDLS), used to manage the complexity.   
The first step in the research process was to obtain information for the case 
study from several different sources.  The researcher focused on documents and 
information available through open sources such as defense publications and 
newspapers.  The researcher then transitioned to a literature review on complexity 
theory.   
The next step in the research process was to interview members of the 
Project Management Office for the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (PM SBCT).  
Since the development of the MGS is still in progress, many of the program’s key 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 5 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
providing information for the case study.  As part of the research process, the author 
arranged interviews with current and former government and private-sector 
individuals who were involved with the development of the MGS both directly and 
indirectly.   
According to Robert K. Yin, the author of Case Study Research, the 
researcher should approach a case study as an open-ended investigation (Yin, 
2003, p. 90).  Each interview served as a source of information, but the research had 
to corroborate all of the information gained from the interview to present a clear and 
concise case.  When conducting the interviews, the author focused the questions on, 
“satisfying the needs of [the case study’s] own line of inquiry while simultaneously 
putting forth friendly and non-threatening questions in open ended interviews” (2003, 
p. 90).   
3. Limitations    
The case study attempts to fill some of the gap between the literature on 
complexity in the defense acquisition environment and the literature on how program 
management offices manage complexity.  The case study uses a recent Army 
acquisition program to provide relevant lessons learned for acquisition professionals.   
The case study has two main limitations.  First, it attempts to draw 
conclusions on how an acquisition program managed complexity by analyzing a 
segment in time, 2000-2006.  The case study also focuses on one specific 
development issue: reliability growth.  The main limitation of this approach is that it 
does not fully address everything that the MGS PMO conducted during this period.     
Second, the author was able to interview a broad range of individuals from 
both the government and the private sector for the case study, but it is possible that 
bias existed within the interview content.  To mitigate this, the author interviewed 
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D. Organization of the Case Study 
The case study specifically addresses one critical challenge of the MGS 
development, but in a wider sense, this is not the purpose of the case study.  The 
discussion of the reliability shortfalls is merely a means of discussing how programs 
self-organize in the face of complexity.  Therefore, it was necessary to start from a 
very broad perspective when addressing the Mobile Gun System program’s 
management of complexity.   
In Chapter I, the case study introduces the research question, the 
methodology, and the organization of the case study.  The opening discussion on 
the Diyala vignette frames the case study’s analysis.   
Chapter II, “What is Complexity,” introduces complexity theory, and it starts 
from a very broad perspective with a discussion of several different theories.  As the 
chapter progresses, it focuses the discussion on complex programs.  In addition to 
discussing complexity in programs, Chapter II also discusses the use of systems 
engineering, risk management, and strategic planning.   
In Chapter III, “The Road to Stryker,” the case study provides a context to the 
outer environment that led to the Interim Force, which was later renamed Stryker.  
Chapter III discusses the Stryker’s champion, General Eric Shinseki, who articulated 
the vision for the Interim Force during the October 1999 Association of the United 
States Army convention.  “The Road to Stryker” also discusses how the acquisition 
reforms of the 1990s affected both the Stryker program as well as its urgency.   
Chapter IV, “The Development of MGS,” provides a more focused discussion 
on the MGS.  In this chapter, the case study describes the unique requirements of 
the MGS and the approach that the program manager took in developing the 
system.  Chapter IV also provides a chronological history of the development 
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Chapter V, “Managing Complexity,” focuses on the reliability issues 
associated with the MGS ammunition handling system.  The chapter then analyzes 
how the program self-organized during a crisis.  The chapter closes with a 
discussion on the application of complexity theory to the MGS.  During this 
discussion, the author develops several insights on the key aspects of the program’s 
self-organization.   
Chapter VI, “Conclusion and Lessons Learned,” takes the insights from 
Chapter V and discusses program synchronization with a wider perspective.  
Chapter VI then closes with six lessons learned along with several recommendations 
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 II. Complexity—A Literature Review 
A. Introduction   
To gain a greater appreciation for the concept of complexity in product 
development, this case study cast a broad net, starting with a review of several 
seminal perspectives on complexity.  This literature review progressively scopes the 
subject of complexity from a broad discussion to one focused on products and 
systems.  The purpose of this chapter is to describe the theoretical framework for the 
case study, with a focus on complexity.   
The MGS program encountered complexity both internally and externally 
during its development.  Before delving into the nuances of the MGS program’s 
complex environment, it is important to understand the sources of complexity.  Maier 
and Rechin (2000) provide a strong case for understanding the sources of 
complexity when studying technical problems: 
It is generally agreed that increasing complexity is at the heart of the most 
difficult problems facing today’s systems architecting and engineering. When 
architects and builders are asked to explain cost overruns and schedule 
delays, by far the most common, and quite valid, explanation is that the 
system is much more complex than originally thought. The greater the 
complexity, the greater the difficulty. (p. 24) 
It is not the intent of this literature review to provide an exhaustive review of 
all sources on complexity; rather, this chapter discusses how complexity relates to 
products and systems.  This section provides several theoretical views on 
complexity, a description of complex products and systems, characteristics of 
management systems for complex systems, potential problems encountered with the 
management of complex systems, the use of the systems approach, risk 
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B. What is Complexity? 
The term “complexity” frequently describes anything that consists of many 
interrelated parts or is difficult to explain in simple terms.  One can easily find over 
thirty definitions of complexity from different sources, and this section will start by 
discussing three of these definitions.  These perspectives are from Stuart A. 
Kauffman, Herbert A. Simon, and Peter M. Senge.   
1. Self-organization 
In The Origins of Order, Kauffman (1993) provides a view of complexity from 
a physical and biological standpoint.  Within a complex network, he discusses three 
regimes of behavior that include ordered, complex, and chaotic (1993, p. 183).  The 
complex regime is an area on the border between order and chaos.  The dynamics 
of this complex regime are sensitive to the initial conditions and can easily change, 
based on the parameters.  Once parameters are changed, Kauffman describes the 
small and large changes within the complex regime as “avalanches” that affect the 
entire system (1983, p. 174).  He refers to systems that are able to adapt to the 
changes in parameters as “self-organizing,” and this occurs through the 
accumulation of useful variations (Kauffman, 1993, p. 174).  While Kauffman 
addresses the complex regime that bordered on chaos and order, Simon sees 
complexity in hierarchical terms.   
In The Sciences of the Artificial, Herbert A. Simon (1981) refers to complexity 
as something that is “made up of a large number of parts that interact in a non-
simple way” (1981, p. 195).  Simon believed that complexity was hierarchical in 
nature and that each system within the hierarchy had its own unique sub-systems.  
He describes this as a “box within a box,” with each complex system consisting of 
both an inner and outer environment (Simon, 1981, p. 148).  The outer environment 
serves as the operating environment for the inner environment, and the outer 
environment is the inner environment’s primary source of complexity.  For its part, 
the inner environment is constantly adapting and insulating itself from the variations 
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problem” (Simon, 1981, p. 134).  The inner environment’s design quality also 
depends on the limited data available from the outer environment, and this leads to a 
high level of uncertainty and ambiguity.   
In his article, “Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought,” Simon 
stated that “in complex situations there is likely to be a considerable gap between 
the real environment of a decision and the environment as the actors perceive it” 
(1978, May, p. 8).  When a decision-maker addresses uncertainty and gaps in 
perception, he or she can either “satisfice” or seek an optimal solution.  Satisficing 
occurs when the search for a solution “terminates when the best offer exceeds an 
aspiration level that itself adjusts gradually to the value of the offers received so far” 
(1978, p. 10).  Optimizing occurs when the “correct point of termination is found by 
equating the marginal cost of search with the marginal improvement in the set of 
alternatives” (1978, p. 10).  In many situations, the uncertainty of the situation 
causes the decision-maker to arrive at intuitive decisions that are good enough.  
Two methods for satisficing are using “feedback to correct for unexpected or 
incorrectly predicted events” and feed-forward, which is “based on predictions of the 
future, in combination with feedback, to correct the errors of the past” (Simon, 1981, 
p. 44).  Feed-forward requires some awareness of the predicted consequences of 
decisions.   
Feed-forward is challenging for organizations because people have difficulty 
maintaining awareness over such a large number of potentially relevant 
considerations (Simon, 1978, p. 8).  Over time, these organizations learn “in the form 
of reaction to perceived consequences,” and this learning is the dominant way that 
rationality develops in an environment of uncertainty (1978, p. 8).  The large number 
of potential considerations makes a situation or problem complex.  The interrelated 
nature of these problems makes rational decision-making more difficult because of 
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2. Dynamic versus Detail Complexity 
Senge (2007), the author of The Fifth Discipline, differentiates problems that 
exhibit detail complexity and dynamic complexity.  Detail complexity consists of a 
brief snapshot in time of a relatively static system in which there are many different 
variables to explain cause and effect (2007, p. 71).  The preponderance of analytical 
and forecasting tools that are currently used address detail complexity.  Problem-
solvers who are accustomed to solving problems involving detail complexity frame 
the problem as a closed event in terms of time and space.  However, the analytical 
and forecasting tools that use detail complexity do not provide a clear cause and 
effect with dynamic complexity because cause and effect are “subtle and the 
consequences of actions occur over time” (2007, p. 71).  Senge describes several 
situations in which dynamic complexity may exist, including: 
When the same action has dramatically different effects in the short and long 
run […], when an action has one set of consequences locally and a very 
different set of consequences in another part of the system [… and] when 
obvious interventions produce non-obvious consequences. (2007, p. 71) 
Senge believes that dynamic complexity is the source of most problems and 
that the key to understanding it is the identification of patterns and relationships in 
variables.  Unlike the variables in detail complexity, the variables in dynamic 
complexity are interdependent and difficult to separate.  Since most problem-solvers 
look at problems in terms of brief snapshots in time and in a relatively linear manner, 
finding the actual source of an issue is problematic.  From Senge’s perspective, 
individuals should view a dynamic problem in a holistic manner with a systems 
approach. 
Senge also believes that the dynamic nature of these problems requires 
organizations that excel at learning.  Complex and dynamic systems require cross-
functional teams made up of “people who need one another to act” (2007, p. 219).  
The centerpiece of this effort is “collaborative learning,” in which teams engage in 
open dialogue and explore complex issues from many perspectives (2007, p. 221).  
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insightfully about complex issues, 2) utilize innovative, coordinated action, and 3) 
understand the roles of team members on other teams (2007, p. 219).  A key 
impediment to the use of the systems approach is the existence of defensive 
routines that blur the facts or the reality of the situation.  Effective teams can nullify 
these defensive routines by embracing conflicting ideas and by ensuring the free 
flow of information, both bad and good.    
The common theme within each perspective is that complexity occurs in 
many different environments and situations but mainly in moving or dynamic 
systems in which adaptation occurs in subtle and non-linear ways.  
C. Complexity in Programs 
Both Kauffman (1993) and Simon (1981) view the outer environment as the 
primary source of complexity.  In a similar manner, Marco Iansiti (1995), the author 
of “Technology Integration: Managing Technological Evolution in a Complex 
Environment” views a complex product as the adaptation to “requirements from an 
organization’s existing environment” (p. 521).  A product is the result of the fusion of 
technical concepts and existing knowledge within an organization.  In his view, 
complexity in new product development originates from the requirements, sources of 
knowledge, and processes that lead to the creation of the product itself (p. 522).  For 
a comprehensive discussion of a Complex Product System, Mike Hobday (1998), 
the author of Product Complexity, Innovation and Industrial Organization, provides a 
clear definition and a list of factors that contribute to product complexity.   
Hobday (1998) defines a complex product or system as “any high cost, 
engineering-intensive product, sub-system, system or construct supplied by a unit of 
production” (p. 2).  Many of these complex products are the result of new and 
emerging technology and involve “high levels of uncertainty and risk” (p. 5).  Hobday 
also provides a list of interdependent product dimensions that characterize complex 
products.  These factors include: 
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 Product volume, 
 Degree of technological novelty, 
 Extent of embedded software in the product, 
 Quantity of sub-systems and components, 
 Degree of customization of components, 
 Complexity and choice of system architectures, 
 Quantity of alternative component design paths, 
 Feedback loops from later to earlier stages, 
 Variety of distinct knowledge bases, 
 Variety of skills and engineering inputs, 
 Intensity of user involvement, 
 Uncertainty/change in user requirements, 
 Intensity of other supplier involvement, and 
 Intensity of regulatory involvement. (Hobday, 1998, p. 10) 
These product dimensions increase the difficulty of coordination and systems 
architecture, and they make coordination among contributing stakeholders an 
essential element of success.   
Robert W. Rykroft and Don E. Kash (1999) discuss complexity in product 
development in their book The Complexity Challenge: Technological Innovation for 
the 21st Century.  Rykroft and Kash define technological complexity as “any 
technology that could not be understood in detail by an expert individual” (1999, p. 
54).  They provide several conceptualizations of product complexity that include the 
number of components in a system, the “relationship between process and product 
technologies,” and the use of feedback loops to self-adjust or self-correct system 
attributes known as cybernetics (1999, p. 55).  They describe the complex systems 
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mass production that are characterized by a “high degree of risk and uncertainty, a 
constant sense of novelty, a drive to solve new problems, and above all, a lot of trial-
and-error searching and non-linear learning” (Rykroft & Kash, 1999, p. 28).   
The sense of novelty that characterizes the development of complex systems 
means that learning organizations must have a core competency in accumulating 
and transferring information as well as a proven process to reflect on new 
information (1999, p. 62).  The pressure of meeting a time-to-market requires the 
organization to employ “error-embracing behavior” in order to gain insights on 
complex systems during their development (1999, p. 63).  However, error-embracing 
behavior does not produce substantial improvements in time-to-market unless 
organizations understand the importance of communication throughout the 
organizational network.    
These perspectives provide similar discussions on complex product 
characteristics, the use of feedback loops, self-correcting systems, and non-linear 
learning.  The drive to field these complex systems at a faster rate while adapting to 
a changing environment requires a seamless relationship between technology and 
the organization. 
1. Characteristics of Management Systems 
Numerous models provide a framework for creating a new product and 
managing its development.  Roy C. Rothwell (1992), in his article “Successful 
Industrial Innovation: Critical Factors for the 1990s,” provides a useful description of 
five generations of innovation processes, starting in the 1960s.  The first two 
generations of models describe “technology-push” and “need pull” as linear and 
sequential models of development (1992, p. 221).  The third-generation model 
continues the use of a sequential process, but it also included the use of feedback 
loops.  The fourth-generation model of the 1980s went to the use of a parallel 
process to cut down on cycle-time and emphasized integration between R&D and 
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processes and systems integration, with an emphasis on collaboration among 
organizations (Rothwell, 1992, p. 221).      
Although Hobday did not differentiate the five generations of industrial 
innovation, he concurred with Rothwell that complex products and systems do not 
follow the “conventional model” of development (Hobday, 1998, p. 18).  He 
emphasized that the key difference between complex products and systems and 
simple systems was user involvement because such systems were “individually 
developed and tailored […] for a particular customer” (Hobday, 1998, p. 19).  Rykroft 
and Kash (1999) strongly endorse the importance of strong collaboration between 
the user and the system developer.   
Rykroft and Kash contend that the use of the linear model works well with 
mature technology in a mass-production environment but is ill-suited for the 
development of tailored, complex systems because it detracts from rapid decision-
making (Rykroft & Kash, 1999, p. 59).  The user and marketplace demand for 
complex technology requires a faster cycle-time using non-linear concurrent models.  
These models accentuate collaboration among many different organizations, firms, 
and agencies and “error-embracing behavior” (1999, p. 63).  To reduce cycle-time, 
Rothwell identified a number of factors that influenced a “time-based strategy,” 
including those listed below. 
 Adequate preparation: careful project evaluation, analysis, and 
planning, as well as gaining the commitment of those who will be 
involved in the project, 
 Efficient indirect development activities: project control, administration, 
and coordination 50% of total project time, 
 Adoption of a more horizontal management style with increased 
decision-making at lower levels, 
 Efficient upstream data linkages and an inter-company liaison: 
involving primary suppliers at an early stage of development, 
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 Modification of the development process: maximizing the use of 
simulation models through the use of expert systems, 
 Incremental improvement strategy: continuous improvements of 
existing products, 
 Carry-over strategies: use of significant elements of earlier models in 
the most recent designs, 
 Designed-in flexibility: creation of flexible designs,  
 Fuller organizational and systems integration: minimizing the number 
of reporting layers, and 
 Fully developed internal database (1992, p. 234-235). 
Although Rykroft and Kash contend that the linear model is inadequate for 
innovating complex technology, they admit that the non-linear and dynamic system 
is crisis-oriented and messy.  They apply the term “self-organizing” to the description 
of networks of leaders, knowledge workers, and groups who share risk and 
information across organizational boundaries (Rykroft & Kash, 1992, p. 90).  The 
second pillar, “evolutionary learning,” is the imperfect and messy process of 
integrating and testing components while applying knowledge to keep pace with 
technological progress (1992, p. 135).    
While Rykroft and Kash impart a conceptual perspective on the management 
of complex products and systems, Iansiti offers some best practices for technology 
integration.  Like most of the authors mentioned, he subscribes to a systems 
approach as the best means of problem solving and decision-making, and he points 
out that the most important period of a technology integration project is during 
project specification.  During this stage, he accentuates the importance of a broad 
and informed approach to framing problems and searching for solutions through 
multiple contexts (Iansiti, 1995, p. 525).   
Several authors emphasized the crisis-oriented approach to the development 
of complex products and systems.  While the non-linear approach may cut down on 
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organizations, risk acceptance, and capturing and disseminating knowledge to 
stakeholders in a timely manner.  The next section highlights several of the potential 
problem areas that programs encounter when they manage complex systems using 
a non-linear approach.     
2. Common Managerial Problems with Complex Programs  
In his article “Managing Innovation in Complex Product Systems,” Howard 
Rush (1997) identified three “hotspot” categories: 1) requirements identification, 2) 
coordination of information, and 3) process issues (p. 4/2).  The considerable time 
pressures that differentiate complex products and systems often lead to inadequate 
system requirements that necessitate later revision.  The intensity of organizational 
coordination in complex products and systems also requires the diffusion of explicit 
and tacit knowledge—a typical coordination issue.  Another problem that permeated 
these types of programs is the lack of adequate staffing due to the exigent nature of 
the program’s formation.  The lack of staffing is a potential cause of short cuts taken 
in processes and best practices (Rush, 1997). 
Although several of the authors advocated following a less linear and 
sequential model of development for complex products and systems, they all 
advocated following some type of process.  Nelson P. Repenning (2001) discusses 
the potential impact of not following a process during new product development in 
his paper “Understanding Fire Fighting in New Product Development.”  In the context 
of product development, Repenning describes fire fighting as the “unplanned 
allocation of engineers and other resources to fix problems discovered late in a 
product’s development cycle” (2001, p. 5).  He believes that dedicating a large 
number of resources to fighting fires takes away valuable resources from other 
critical project activities.  He attributes the persistent fire-fighting mentality to 
organizations that do not possess an in-house capability for organizational learning.  
These organizations also fail to allocate resources, and they attribute the cause of 
their problems to the “attitude and disposition of the people working within the 
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3. Applying the Systems Approach 
A common theme in this literature review is that most complexity problems 
are dynamic in nature.  “Systems thinking” is a holistic approach to understanding 
and comprehending the many variables present in dynamic situations.  Senge fully 
advocates the adoption of systems thinking when he says,  
[W]e tend to focus on snapshots of isolated parts of the system, and wonder 
why our deepest problems never seem to get solved.  Systems thinking is a 
conceptual framework, a body of knowledge and tools that has been 
developed over the past fifty years, to make the full patterns clearer, and to 
help us see how to change them effectively. (2007, p. 7) 
As a conceptual framework, the systems approach attempts to make sense of 
systems that have many interrelated parts.  During product development, the 
practical means of realizing the systems approach is through the discipline known as 
systems engineering.  During the post-World War II period, systems engineering 
emerged as a means to develop solutions to dynamic problems.  Systems 
engineering takes the insights gained from systems thinking “with an orientation 
toward the engineering and analysis of technical systems” (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 
2006, p. 19). 
The Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) defines systems 
engineering as “an interdisciplinary collaborative approach to derive, evolve, and 
verify a lifecycle balanced solution which satisfies customer expectations and meets 
public acceptability” (1994, p. 11).  The International Council on System Engineering 
(INCOSE) defines systems engineering as 
an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of 
successful systems. It focuses on defining customer needs and required 
functionality early in the development cycle, documenting requirements, and 
then proceeding with design synthesis and system validation while 
considering the complete problem. Systems Engineering considers both the 
business and the technical needs of all customers with the goal of providing a 
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The Defense Acquisition Guidebook defines systems engineering in 
this way: 
Systems engineering is the overarching process that a program team applies 
to transition from a stated capability need to an operationally effective and 
suitable system.  Systems engineering encompasses the application of 
systems engineering processes across the acquisition lifecycle (adapted to 
each and every phase) and is intended to be the integrating mechanism for 
balanced solutions addressing capability needs, design considerations and 
constraints, as well as limitations imposed by technology, budget, and 
schedule.  The systems engineering processes are applied early in concept 
definition, and then continuously throughout the total lifecycle. (DoD, 2008, p. 
4.1) 
The common theme among these definitions is the focus on meeting a user’s 
needs through an interdisciplinary approach to solving technical problems with a 
lifecycle orientation.   
In accordance with the DoD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition 
System, the use of the systems engineering process is the official policy of the DoD, 
and it will “optimize system performance and minimize total ownership costs” (Under 
Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2003a).  The DoD program manager is empowered to 
develop a tailored systems engineering approach for a particular program that will 
integrate systems engineering processes throughout a product’s lifecycle.  
4. Use of Risk Management 
Simon described the difficulty of rational decision-making under uncertainty 
when he said, “reasonable men reach reasonable conclusions in circumstances 
where they have no prospect of applying classical models of substantive rationality” 
(Simon, 1978, p. 14).  Complex programs that are unable to manage complexity and 
uncertainty will quickly fall into a resource-intensive fire-fighting mode (Repenning, 
2001).  
Complex programs must adapt to an outer environment that consists of a 
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leads to an environment of uncertainty and ambiguity.  Programs categorize risk as 
either internal or external.  In the article, “On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Complexity 
in Project Management,” Pich, Loch and DeMeyer expressed uncertainty and 
ambiguity in terms of “information adequacy” (2002, p. 1008).  External risk is more 
difficult to mitigate and often falls into the category of “unknown-unknowns” (Pich et 
al., 2002, p. 1019).  Ambiguity is an unknown-known, and it occurs when a program 
lacks awareness of a particular problem but is able to improve the availability of 
information about the unknown through the expenditure of resources (2002, p. 
1013).  This is in contrast to “unknown-unknowns” that exist and exert a significant 
impact on complex programs but are completely unforeseen by a program manager 
(2002, p. 1019).      
The proactive and consistent management of risk is an essential element of 
successful projects (PMI, 2004, p. 240).  The risk management process assumes 
that problems are recognizable through the early identification of signals that 
indicate a potential problem.  The Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition 
defines risk as “a measure of future uncertainties in achieving program performance 
goals and objectives within defined cost, schedule, and performance constraints” 
(DAU, 2006, August, p. 1).  Furthermore, it organizes risk into three components: 1) 
a future root cause, 2) a probability or likelihood, and 3) a consequence or effect 
(2006, August, p. 1).  The Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition emphasizes 
the use of risk management throughout a program’s lifecycle by suggesting a strong 
integration with the systems engineering and test and evaluation processes. The 
Risk Management Guide also identifies several common risk-related attributes to 
successful programs: 
 Feasible, stable, and well-understood user requirements, supported by 
leadership/stakeholders, and integrated with program decisions; 
 A close partnership with users, industry, and other stakeholders; 
 A planned risk management process integral to the acquisition 
process, especially to the technical planning (SEP and TEMP) 
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 Continuous, event-driven technical reviews to help define a program 
that satisfies the user’s needs within acceptable risk; 
 Identified risks and completed risk analyses; 
 Developed, resourced, and implemented risk mitigation plans; 
 Acquisition and support strategies consistent with risk level and risk 
mitigation plans; 
 Established thresholds and criteria for proactively implementing 
defined risk mitigation plans; 
 Continuous and iterative assessment of risks; 
 The risk analysis function independent from the PM; 
 A defined set of success criteria for performance, schedule, and cost 
elements and a formally documented risk management process. (DAU, 
August, 2006, p. 5)  
Every program has some element of risk whether its managers know it or not, 
and it is the basic responsibility of any manager of a complex program to manage 
risk.  A major determinant to a program manager’s ability to manage risk is the 
program’s strategic approach.     
5. Strategic Planning  
Complex programs require a significant degree of coordination and 
synchronization to achieve their managers’ objectives and overcome ill-structured 
problems.  Approaching ill-structured problems requires the program manager (PM) 
to engage in a process known as strategic planning.  Simon (1976) described 
strategy as a “time binding” process in which “a series of decisions determine 
behavior over a certain stretch of time” (p. 67).  Porter (1996) discussed strategy in 
terms of different and unique positioning.  He defined strategy as “the creation of a 
unique and valuable position, involving a different set of activities,” which involves 
positioning a “tailored set of activities” (p. 68).  Porter also stated that the “essence 
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Porter emphasized three types of “fit” for an organization: 1) simple 
consistency, 2) reinforcing, and 3) optimization of effort (1996, pp. 71-73).  
Consistency occurs when an organization communicates a common message, and 
the organization’s activities reflect a “single-minded” approach to meeting objectives 
(1996, p. 71).  The reinforcement of fit occurs when activities strengthen and build 
on one another—similar to the manner in which risk management reinforces 
systems engineering (1996, p. 72).  The optimization of effort occurs when an 
organization’s activities are coordinated and minimize the amount of wasted effort.  
While strategies consist of many interrelated activities, it is essential to keep in mind 
that the whole matters more than the any individual part (1996, p. 73).   
In terms of complex acquisition programs, the Defense Systems Management 
College (DSMC) defines strategy as a “framework for planning, organizing, staffing, 
controlling, and leading a program,” that is designed to “achieve program objectives 
within specified resource constraints” (1999, p. 1-1).  Programs also tailor strategies 
to the goals, objectives and customer or user expectations with the goal of achieving 
resilience and stability over time (Porter, 1996, p. 66; DSMC, 1999, p. 1-1, 1-2).  
Strategy is also a means for program leadership to set clear priorities, integrate 
program activities, and serve as a decision-making aid for individuals throughout the 
organization (Porter, 1996, p. 69; DSMC, 1999, p. 1-4).   
Specific to defense programs, there are five characteristics to acquisition 
strategy: 1) realism, 2) stability, 3) resource balance, 4) flexibility, and 5) managed 
risk (DSMC, 1999, p. 2-1).  Changes to an acquisition strategy often result in 
changes to a program’s overall risk level, and therefore, the project leadership must 
flexibly adjust the acquisition strategy to changes in the environment (1999, p. 2-7).  
The acquisition strategy should also serve as a guide for program stakeholders on 
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D. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide a theoretical framework for this 
case study, with a focus on complexity.  Complex programs, particularly those using 
a time-based strategy of fielding, require a unique set of considerations to achieve 
success.  The MGS clearly falls into the category of a complex system, and the MGS 
program certainly embraced a dynamic self-organization to adapt to the outside 
environment.  The next chapter provides a context to the outer environment of the 
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III. The Road to Stryker 
A. Introduction 
We [the Army] discovered that most of our heavy equipment, in a country that 
was wrestling to reestablish itself economically, tore their roads up so badly 
that commerce could not get through. And then we had to come back in and 
repair those roads. (as cited in Hillen, 2000) 
General Eric Shinseki’s observation could describe any number of situations 
in Iraq or Afghanistan.  However, General Shinseki’s comment describes road 
conditions encountered in Bosnia in 1997.  As the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) 
from 1999–2003, it was his responsibility to set the Army’s azimuth and ensure that 
the Army could meet all of its obligations in accordance with the National Security 
Strategy and National Military Strategy.  For General Shinseki, the fundamental 
problem was to determine what the Army should be for the next 30 years.  Through 
this exercise, he identified a clear capability gap between the evolving strategic 
environment and the Army’s existing capabilities (Hillen, 2000).   
To close this gap, he initiated a transformational strategy for the Army that he 
anticipated would last from 1999 to 2030.  Sustaining this long-term strategy 
required a series of incremental changes to provide “irreversible momentum” 
(Shinseki, 2003).  Embedded within Army Transformation was the implementation of 
the Interim Force (renamed the Stryker Brigade Combat Team in 2002), which 
ultimately served as the catalyst and initial increment of Army Transformation 
(Shinseki, 2001, p. 12).   
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the origins of the Mobile Gun 
System as part of Stryker.  The background includes a description of the evolving 
strategic environment of the 1990s, the strategy of Army Transformation, the Interim 
Force operational requirements, and the subsequent selection of the materiel 
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B. Strategic Context: An Uncertain and Volatile Environment 
The end of the Cold War brought an increase in small-scale contingencies 
that intensified the demand for ground-force commitments. Fiscally, the decreasing 
size of defense budgets constrained fiscal resources and forced a more disciplined 
prioritization of effort.  Economically, the United States experienced a prolonged 
period of growth that enabled an intensive investment in private-sector research and 
development and led to an increasingly integrated global community.  
Technologically, the availability of information technology was rapidly improving the 
availability of relevant and real-time information. The Army found itself on a new 
playing field, yet it still had the same doctrine, organization, and culture as it had in 
the Cold War period.  The next section discusses the increase in small-scale 
contingencies and the Army’s structural misalignment. 
1. A New Focus on Small-scale Contingencies 
Throughout the 1990s, unpredictable events caused the United States to 
place the Army into a number of potentially disastrous situations such as early 
Desert Shield in 1990, Somalia in 1993, Haiti in 1994, Bosnia in 1997, and Kosovo in 
1999.  A rapid commitment of ground forces to remote regions characterized these 
deployments.  An example of a potentially disastrous situation occurred shortly after 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.  The US lacked a medium-force that could 
rapidly respond to an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia, and it committed the lightly 
equipped 82nd Airborne Division as a stopgap measure.  The Army essentially “held 
its breath” as this unit secured the border against several divisions of Iraqi armor 
until heavy US units arrived (Hillen, 2000).  Several years later, a company of 
Rangers incurred heavy casualties while operating without the benefit of armored 
vehicles in the congested streets of central Mogadishu.  Soon thereafter, the 
deployment of heavy armor, such as M-1 tanks, to the Balkans was restricted due to 
the narrow roads and weight-restricted bridges in the region.   
Concurrent with the increase in small-scale contingencies was the growing 
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allowed sub-national and transnational groups to improve their ability to 
communicate and coordinate their efforts (Shinseki, 2001, p. 4).  The multi-polar 
international security environment was increasingly vulnerable to the criminal and 
terrorist elements that used asymmetric tactics to achieve their limited objectives.   
These examples demonstrated a pattern of contingency deployments to 
geographically remote areas under uncertain political and operational conditions.  
During the 1990s, United States reduced the size of the Army from 781,000 to 
479,426, despite the Army’s role as the nation’s primary “military to military 
engagement tool for influencing policies and actions of other nations” (Shinseki, 
2001, p. 2).  The smaller Army was clearly stretched, and its operational tempo 
increased from one deployment every four years to one deployment every fourteen 
weeks following the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Shinseki, 2000, p. 22).   
General Shinseki saw the Army’s contribution to stability as “peacetime 
engagement, crisis management, deterrence, and the kind of rapidly deployable, 
overwhelming combat power that enables such capabilities” (Shinseki, 2000, p. 22).  
His ladder of inference pointed towards an impending crisis on the nation’s strategic 
horizon.   
2. Dealing with Army Structural Misalignment 
These developments revealed a structural gap in the Army’s capabilities.  
Simply put, the Army organized itself for either “high-end” or “low-end” conflict 
(Shinseki, 2000, p. 23).  The decreasing emphasis on high-intensity conflict and the 
prevalence of small-scale contingencies urgently necessitated a force optimized for 
these conditions—specifically a force that fell in a “medium” range between the 
existing high- and low-end formations.     
Ten years after the end of the Cold War, the Army retained a mix of heavy 
and light “Legacy” formations that it had organized on the Cold War paradigm.  The 
light formations were capable of rapid deployment, but they lacked sufficient 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 28 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
On the other hand, the heavy formations were extremely lethal and survivable, but 
they depended on enormous transportation assets that required well-developed 
airfields and seaports at the destination point.  The Army lacked a medium capability 
that could provide a mix of heavy and light capabilities.  To address this urgent 
situation, General Shinseki initiated Army Transformation.     
C. The Vision: Initiate Irreversible Momentum 
General Shinseki was concerned that the Army could potentially become 
irrelevant if it did not adapt to the changing environment.  Its current force structure 
was difficult to deploy and, in many ways, was a liability.   
1. General Shinseki’s Ladder of Inference 
Recognizing the Army’s shortcomings, General Shinseki initiated changes 
that led to a force that could dominate the full spectrum of conflict, not just the high 
and low ends.  He saw the next major contingency occurring in a place like Central 
Asia or East Timor, not the North German Plain.  General Shinseki underscored how 
important it was to change the Army when he stated:  
Frankly, the magnificent army that fought in Desert Storm is a great army […]. 
But it was one we designed for the Cold War, and the Cold War has been 
over for ten years now. As we look forward to the next century, we've seen a 
bit of what that next century is going to look like, and the kinds of 
deployments we've had in the last ten years. (as cited in Hillen, 2000) 
General Shinseki was also concerned that the Legacy Forces were overly 
dependent on predictable air and sea debarkation points that were easy targets for a 
future adversary.  Consequently, he made it a requirement to insert an Army brigade 
anywhere in the world, including austere airfields, within 96 hours (Shinseki, 2000, p. 
28).  The end state of the Army’s Transformation was the Objective Force, later 
known as the Future Combat System (FCS).  Through Army Transformation, the 
Objective Force would be operational starting around 2010.  To hedge the capability 
gap, General Shinseki modernized the Legacy Forces, and created the Interim 
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urgency for change.  The ladder of inference forced him to confront the brutal fact 
that the Army faced potential irrelevance if it did not close the medium-force 
capability gap (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2. The Urgency behind the Interim Force Caused by the Medium-
force Capability Gap  
2. A Time-based Change Strategy 
The purpose of the Interim Force was to serve as the bridge between the 
current capabilities and the Objective Force.  The Interim Force would provide the 
medium-force capability, as well as insights on doctrine, organization, and 
technology for the Objective Force (Shinseki, 2000, p. 28).  The Interim Force was 
also the vital link for General Shinseki’s change strategy, and he placed command 
emphasis on its urgency.  With a four-year time horizon as the CSA, General 
Shinseki understood that the Interim Force concept was the foothold for Army 
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In my case, the appointment is for four years.  As I've looked back at the 
tenures of other chiefs, generally the good ideas that found their way into 
implementation are the ones that were begun early […]. I just believe that I've 
got to get the momentum early.  That’s important to transformation, and my 
contribution to wherever transformation ends up happening is providing that 
momentum so that future chiefs can build on it […]. Generally, it’s the first two 
years that’ll make the difference. (as cited in Hillen, 2000)  
The urgent nature of the capability gap necessitated the selection of an 
Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) that was immediately available.  The urgent nature of 
the threat and his ability to transform the military necessitated the adoption of a time-
based transformation strategy.  General Shinseki stipulated that this vehicle be an 
“off-the-shelf system” for procurement in FY2000 (Shinseki, 2001, p. 12).  According 
to Lieutenant General Paul J. Kern, the Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of 
the Army for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics at the time of the IAV selection, 
General Shinseki continuously pushed the Army to move faster with the selection of 
the materiel solution for the IBCT (Federal News Service, 2000).   
Furthermore, General Shinseki’s four-year time horizon as the Chief of Staff 
of the Army played a critical role in driving the IAV schedule, and he provided highly 
detailed direction over decisions that might have an impact on its success.  This 
oversight included the review and approval of the IAV Request for Proposal (RFP) 
(Baumgardner, 2000, April 7).   
General Shinseki’s time horizon as the CSA acted as the upper parameter for 
the Mobile Gun System’s development schedule.  Within the IAV Source Selection 
Plan, originally published in March 2000, the time for those vehicles requiring 
“extended variant/configuration development” was not to exceed 24 months, which 
included government testing (Kern, 2000).  In effect, the developmental strategy for 
the MGS was time-based, not event-based, from the very beginning.        
The intent of the Interim Force concept was to have a combat formation that 
was packaged at the Aerial Point of Embarkation (APOE) and immediately available 
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capability provided the Army with a unique ability to place a large, well-equipped 
force deep into a threat environment.  The Interim Force could use operational 
maneuver to go where it was least expected while having the capability to sustain 
itself and fight.  General Shinseki, however, had a holistic view of Transformation, 
and it clearly encompassed more than just a new vehicle.  He said: 
As we talk about transformation, we intend to get into the design of our units 
[…]. As we reduce the size of our platforms, we also reduce the size of this 
rather significant logistical footprint, and that gives us the kind of agility that 
will put us in places that are least expected. We can reduce our predictability 
and get in there faster. (as cited in Hillen, 2000)  
His approach was highly aggressive, with an IAV procurement starting in 
FY2000 and an initial operational capability by FY2002.  The unique Interim Force 
requirements also reflected a change in the way that the government approached 
acquisition programs.  
D. Acquisition Reforms of the 1990s 
The IAV program was among the vanguard of programs in the government’s 
effort to revamp and streamline defense acquisition.  During the 1990s, the 
government passed a series of legislative reforms with the intention of aligning 
defense acquisitions with the market-based model found in the commercial sector.  
The driver of these changes, Dr. William J. Perry, the Secretary of Defense from 
1994–1997, wanted to access commercial industry, move away from a separate 
defense industry, achieve near-term cost savings, and capitalize on the technology 
advances of the commercial sector (“DoD News Briefing,” 1995).   
The primary components of the legislative reform of the government’s 
acquisition system were the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA), the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA), and the Services Acquisition Reform Act 
(SARA).  The streamlining of government acquisition regulations also allowed for a 
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1. Use of Performance Specifications over Government Specifications and 
Standards 
One of the more significant elements of these acquisition reforms that 
affected the IAV program was the reduction or elimination in processes for 
specifications and standards.  Previously, the government relied on a wide range of 
military specifications (MilSpec) and military standards (MilStd) to guide the 
contractor on what processes and materiel to use in developing and producing a 
system.  The Defense Standardization Program Policies and Procedures (DoD 
4120.24-M) defines a defense specification as “a document that describes the 
essential technical requirements for purchased materiel that is military unique or 
substantially modified commercial items” (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2000, 
p. 67). 
The purpose of the specification and standards reform movement was to 
allow the contractor to exercise more initiative, infuse innovation into product 
development, and shift to a performance-based specification.  In relinquishing some 
elements of design-oversight and allowing the commercial sector to find  
the materiel solution, the challenge for the government was how to “clearly describe 
technical requirements and provide sufficient verification to assure that products 
meet the users’ needs” (Millett & Gillis, 1998, p. 72).   
2. Use of Non-developmental Items (NDI) and Commercial Off-the-shelf 
(COTS) 
With a drive for a peace dividend following the end of the Cold War, the DoD 
had fewer funds available for research and development.  The decrease in research 
and development funding required the DoD to look towards the private sector for 
products and services that were immediately available.  The DoD termed these 
items as either Non-development Items (NDI) or Commercial Off-the-shelf (COTS).   
In a June 2000 report, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) provided 
a list of best practices and lessons learned for NDI and COTS.  The report defined a 
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one that is sold, leased, or licensed to the general public; offered by a vendor 
trying to profit from it; supported and evolved by the vendor who retains the 
intellectual property rights; available in multiple, identical copies; and used 
without modification of the internals. (Gansler, 2000, July, p. 3) 
The DoD aggressively pushed to maximize the use of COTS and NDI to 
reduce cycle-time, increase the pace of new technology insertion, improve reliability 
and availability, and lower the total lifecycle costs (Gansler, 2000, July, p. 2).  COTS 
are a subset of NDI and are defined as: 
Items that are used exclusively for government purposes by a Federal 
Agency, a state or local government, or a foreign government with which the 
United States has a mutual defense cooperation agreement; and any item 
described here that requires only minor modifications of the type customarily 
available in the commercial marketplace in order to meet the requirements of 
the processing department or agency. (Gutierrez, 2002, p. 66)   
While the intent of NDI and COTS was to “simplify and accelerate the 
acquisition process,” the use of NDI and COTS also incurred programmatic risk 
(Steves, 1997, p. 40).  Among the risks associated with NDI and COTS are the 1) 
form, fit, and function characteristics, 2) ability to adapt interface and data standards, 
3) vendor’s anticipated and intended use of the NDI and COTS, 4) vendor’s test 
approach, and 5) the government’s ability to verify vendor test results (Gutierrez, 
2002, p. 68).    
3. IAV Request for Proposal (RFP) 
When the IAV Program Management Office released the draft RFP in 
December 1999, it did not contain detailed specifications because the program 
manager wanted to provide the contractors with the maximum amount of flexibility in 
tailoring their proposals (Dawson, 2001, p. 56).  The final RFP, published in April 
2000, contained a performance-based Statement of Work (SOW) founded on the 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD); it also contained only seven 
government specifications and standards (Dawson, 2001, pp. 76, 95).  The final RFP 
also allowed the possibility of awarding separate contracts for the Infantry Carrier 
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The government presented four alternatives for contract awards in the RFP: 1) one 
award for the ICV variants and MGS variant, 2) one award for ICV variants and one 
award for the MGS, 3) one award for the ICV variants only, or 4) one award for the 
MGS only (Gamboa, 2001, April 9, p. 4).   
Working closely with the materiel developer, the Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) conducted a parallel effort to develop the operational 
requirements.  Although the government could request a waiver to use military 
specifications and standards through the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), the 
waiver process was long and generally discouraging because the DoD was trying to 
move away from the old ways of doing business.  It was not until 2005 that the DoD 
eliminated the waiver policy to increase the program manager’s flexibility to cite 
military specifications and standards within a solicitation or contract (Kratz, 2005).    
E. A New Approach: Interim Force Requirements 
The Interim Force requirements reflected the ambiguous and uncertain threat 
model of the 21st century.  The Army chose a new and innovative path to the Interim 
Force when it transitioned from a threat-based to a unit-based approach to 
requirements.  The next section discusses the transition of requirements concepts, 
the Stryker operational tenets, and the source selection. 
1. Transition from Threat-based to Unit-based Requirements  
In previous armored vehicle acquisitions, the Army developed requirements 
based on a clearly defined threat.  During the Cold War period, the Army could draw 
on abundant amounts of information about known threat systems.  For instance, the 
Army developed the requirements for the M-1 Abrams Tank and the M-2 Bradley 
Fighting Vehicle to counter a known spectrum of Warsaw Pact platforms and tactics.  
Although both vehicles functioned as part of a combined arms team, the Army did 
not stipulate a requirement for commonality.  Additionally, these systems went 
through a deliberate systems development process that included several iterations 
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January 29, 2009).  The Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) was the Army’s first new 
armored combat vehicle since 1981, and the Army saw an opportunity to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness with a new approach (Federal News Service, 2000). 
The Army designed a new type of brigade from the ground up that it 
designated as the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT).  The Army intended for the 
Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) to serve as the common vehicle platform to meet the 
unit’s holistic requirements.  The requirements for the Stryker were captured in the 
Operational Requirements Document, written by the user community and describing 
the system’s intended mission and the anticipated operational and sustainment 
concepts.  The Medium Armored Vehicle Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD) broadly described the threat in this way: 
Asymmetric warfare focuses whatever may be one side’s comparative 
advantage against an enemy’s relative weakness.  A defining and 
distinguishing aim of asymmetric warfare is the creation of conditions where 
the enemy’s relative advantage cannot be applied is degraded or neutralized 
[sic].  The IBCT [Interim Brigade Combat Team] will be employed worldwide, 
wherever US interests are threatened.  To this end, potential threat forces will 
be armed with various mixes of increasingly sophisticated weaponry. 
(Federation of American Scientists, 2000) 
The Army determined that it wanted a medium-unit capability that could 
function in the both the “full spectrum environment” and small-scale contingencies 
(Federation of American Scientists, 2000).  Upon achieving its full operation 
capability, the Interim Force would prevent the Army from becoming irrelevant 
through the ability to insert a “credible combat force on the ground anywhere in the 
world in 96 hours from liftoff” (Panel on Operational Test Design and Evaluation of 
the Interim Armored Vehicle, 2004, p. 117).     
2. Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Operational Concept  
The ORD for the Stryker defines the top-level operational capabilities desired 
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Operational Test Design and Evaluation of the Interim Armored Vehicle, 2004, p. 
117).  The ORD describes the top-level capabilities of the IBCT: 
As a full spectrum combat force, the IBCT is capable of conducting all major 
doctrinal operations including offensive, defensive, stability, and support 
actions.  Its core operational capabilities rest upon excellent operational and 
tactical mobility, enhanced situational understanding, combined arms 
integration down to the company level, and high dismount strengths for close 
combat in urban and complex terrain.  Properly integrated through a mobile 
robust C4ISR network, these core capabilities compensate for platform 
limitations that may exist in the close fight, leading to enhanced force 
effectiveness.  When employed in the operational environment for which it is 
optimized, the IBCT has the capability to achieve decision as a result of its 
early entry, shaping, and decisive actions. (Federation of American Scientists, 
2000) 
The ORD describes the combined arms approach of the IBCT and its 
maneuver advantages.  Unlike the Legacy Forces, the Army intended for the IBCT to 
be in a combat configuration prior to leaving its air or sea embarkation point.  Upon 
arrival in an area of operations, the Army wanted the IBCT prepared for immediate 
combat operations.   
The Army planned for each of the pieces and parts of the IBCT to operate 
together for a holistic capability with a focus on the company level.  For the user 
community, this point is essential because the IBCT is a system-of-systems.  
Although each of the systems can operate individually, when combined, they have a 
decisive effect through their constellation of capabilities.  The ORD discusses the six 
Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) that serve as the performance drivers for the 
IBCT.  KPPs are:  
Those attributes or characteristics of a system that are considered critical or 
essential to the development of an effective military capability and those 
attributes that make a significant contribution to the characteristics of the 
future joint force as defined in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. 
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These KPPs provide metrics in terms of threshold and objective values.  The 
Acquisition Strategy Report for the Interim Armored Vehicle listed four KPPs:   
 Interoperability—possesses an interoperable capability to host and 
integrate existing and planned C4ISR systems. 
 C-130 transportability—is transportable in a C-130 aircraft. 
 Infantry/Engineer Squad—is capable of transporting and protecting a 
9-man infantry or engineer squad. 
 Mobile Gun System Bunker Buster—serves primarily as a bunker 
buster, not as an anti-tank platform. (PM BCT, 2000, p. 14) 
The Army developed the Interim Force KPPs as the critical requirements for a 
family of vehicles that complement one another.  The family of vehicles includes ten 
variants, and the IBCT requires each of these variants to achieve its full capability 
(see Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3. Interim Armored Vehicle Variants  
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F. IAV Acquisition Strategy 
In accordance with DoD Instruction 5000.2, all acquisition programs require 
an approved acquisition strategy upon program initiation (DoD, 2008, p. 2.3).  The 
acquisition strategy uses a total systems approach that takes into account all 
activities that will occur throughout the program’s lifecycle (2008, p. 2.3).  The 
program manager is responsible for preparing the acquisition strategy and tailoring it 
to the program’s specific needs and constraints.  Additionally, the acquisition 
strategy serves as a decision aid by  
prioritizing and integrating many diverse functional requirements, evaluating 
and selecting important issue alternatives, identifying the opportunities and 
times for critical decisions, and providing a coordinated approach to the 
economical and effective achievement of program objectives. (DAU, 2003, p. 
1-4)   
The Army adopted an IAV acquisition strategy that fully supported General 
Shinseki’s charter for a rapidly fielded medium-force that could provide strategic 
responsiveness.  In accordance with General Shinseki’s guidance for the Interim 
Force, the ORD states that, “The initial IBCTs will be populated with systems 
consisting of integrated off-the-shelf capabilities.  Combined with these off-the-shelf 
systems, innovative applications will enable full operational capabilities for the 
interim force” (Federation of American Scientists, 2000). 
The IAV acquisition strategy was unique in that it covered both developmental 
and non-developmental efforts.  For programs that involve development, a 
technology development acquisition strategy is normally used.  In accordance with 
the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, the technology development acquisition 
strategy discusses the management of research and development, the number of 
prototypes, the use of the prototypes in testing, and specific decision points for the 
user and materiel developer to determine the maturity of a system under 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 39 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
1. Evolutionary Approach 
The Army used an acquisition strategy that required the use of NDI to allow 
for rapid fielding while avoiding any type of long system development.  Additionally, 
the acquisition strategy attempted to execute activities such as “development, 
production, testing, fielding, deployment, and sustainment” in a concurrent rather 
than sequential manner (PM SBCT, 2006, March, p. 1).  The IAV acquisition strategy 
adopted an evolutionary acquisition approach.  The DoD 5000.2, The Operation of 
the Defense Acquisition System defines evolutionary acquisition as: 
the preferred DoD strategy for rapid acquisition of mature technology for the 
user. An evolutionary approach delivers capability in increments, recognizing, 
up front, the need for future capability improvements. The objective is to 
balance needs and available capability with resources, and to put capability 
into the hands of the user quickly. The success of the strategy depends on 
consistent and continuous definition of requirements, and the maturation of 
technologies that lead to disciplined development and production of systems 
that provide increasing capability towards a materiel concept. (Under 
Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2003b, p. 4) 
The evolutionary approach aimed to provide continuous, preplanned 
improvements to meet current and future capability gaps as technology matured 
(DoD, 2008, p. 2.3.2).  The Acquisition Strategy Report for the Interim Armored 
Vehicle stated the following objectives: 
 Emphasize rapid acquisition, 
 Incorporate time-phased requirements as appropriate, 
 Integrated acquisition and logistics, 
 Stress interoperability of the IAVs within and outside the BCT, 
 Incorporate Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV), 
 Integrate test and evaluation throughout the process rather than as a 
final exam, 
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 Stress that system performance should also consider better reliability 
and quality, and 
 Investigate and incorporate technology as appropriate throughout the 
lifecycle. (PM BCT, 2000, pp. 10-11) 
The program initially used the March 1996, DoD-Instruction-5000.2R 
acquisition structure with a Milestone I to III; PM SBCT kept this structure for the 
MGS and NBCRV until those programs reached their Milestone III (PM SBCT, 2006, 
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Figure 4. DoD Program Lifecycle Models  
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2. Risk Management  
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook defines risk management as “the 
overarching process that encompasses identification, analysis, mitigation planning, 
mitigation plan implementation, and tracking” (DoD, 2008, p. 4.2.3.5).  Additionally, 
risk management is most effective when the program manager integrates it with a 
program’s systems engineering process “as a driver and a dependency on those 
processes for root cause and consequence management” (DoD, 2008, p. 4.2.3.5).  
The IAV acquisition strategy highlighted four areas of risk for the program.   
For schedule risk, the acquisition strategy discussed the high probability for 
“development, test, and production lead times for the MGS” with an initial 
assessment of red (PM BCT, 2000, p. 23).  The program manager’s mitigation plan 
for the MGS development risk was to substitute suitable in lieu of systems until the 
MGS was available (2000, p. 23). 
For technical risk, the acquisition strategy discussed the potential integration 
issues for the ICV variants with a low probability of occurrence (2000, p. 24).  With 
regard to the ICV, the PM accepted the technical risk.      
G. The Materiel Solution for the IBCT   
Market research began in earnest with the Platform Performance 
Demonstration (PPD) held at Fort Knox, Kentucky, from December 1999 to January 
2000.  During the PPD, the Army hosted 35 candidate platforms from 11 different 
contractors (Steele, 2000, March, p. 24).  The purpose of the PPD was to “determine 
the potential availability of a family or families of systems to equip a new brigade 
organization designed for full spectrum operations” (Bell, November 18, p. 1).   
The PPD served as a market survey for the Army, not as a competition.  
Given the NDI acquisition strategy, the PPD also provided insights on the 
development of the Operational & Organizational Concept and the overarching 
requirements document.  The Army also used it to “evaluate existing systems to 
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brigades was achievable” (PM BCT, 2000, p. 5).  At the close of the PPD, the Army 
provided each contractor with a written report of their vehicle’s potential problem 
areas (Bell, November 18, p. 3).  During the PPD, Major General B.B. Bell, the 
Armor Center’s commanding general at the time, clarified that the PPD was not part 
of the formal competitive process and that the Army was open to both wheeled and 
tracked drivetrains (Steele, 2000, March, p. 24).   
During the PPD, several companies marketed their designs for the MGS 
requirement for the IBCT.  United Defense marketed its M-8 Armored Gun System, a 
tracked vehicle that it developed in the early 1990s to meet an armored 
reconnaissance vehicle requirement for the 82nd Airborne Division.  Despite meeting 
the C-130 transportability requirement and being production ready, the Army 
cancelled the M-8 program in 1996 because of budget constraints (Light Armored 
Vehicles, 2008, August 13).  General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) marketed its 
Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) III with a turreted 105mm gun that it had previously 
used as a demonstrator for international markets (LTG (Ret) Joseph Yakovac, 
personal communication, December 17, 2008).  The GDLS variant demonstrated 
strong potential, but it did not have an auto-loader, an integrated C4ISR suite, a 
coaxial machine gun or commander’s weapon, and fire control modifications to 
integrate the main gun ammunition (Gourley, 2003, May).  All of those components 
were essential to meet ORD requirements for the MGS.   
The PPD was a critical event for developing Non-Developmental Item (NDI) 
assumptions.  The Army assumed that the NDI vehicles could achieve “the system 
requirements with minimal or no modification” based on the PPD observations (PM 
BCT, 2000, p. 18).  Soon after the PPD, the Army published a Request for Proposal 
(RFP) on February 29, 2000, and it began a review of the contractor’s platforms.  
The Source Selection Authority (SSA) for the IAV contract was Lieutenant General 
Paul J. Kern.  The SSA served as the “sole authority designated to direct the 
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1. Contract Award (November 2000)  
Three months behind its original schedule, the Army announced on 
November 16, 2000, that the General Dynamics Land Systems & General Motors 
Limited Liability Corporation (GM/GDLS) won the contract award of the ACAT ID IAV 
vehicle (Hinton, 2001, p. 13).  Seven defense contractors had submitted proposals—
with two contractors, GM/GDLS and UDLP, submitting several proposals.  The 
proposals were evaluated based on five criteria in order of importance: 1 & 2) 
schedule and performance (equal), 3 & 4) supportability and cost (equal), and 5) 
management (Gamboa, 2001, April 9, p. 4).  Within the performance area, the Army 
evaluated a performance requirements element and a commonality element; within 
the supportability area, the Army evaluated a deployability element, a sustainment 
cost element, a system maintainability element, and a predicted reliability element 
(Kern, 2000, p. 9).  Although there were a number of individual variants that had 
superior performance, the Army’s desire for commonality took priority.  Additionally, 
commonality took priority over other suitability factors such as reliability.       
At the contract award announcement, LTG Kern emphasized that he selected 
General Dynamics primarily because of the performance, supportability, and 
commonality that it offered across its ten variants (Gamboa, 2001, April 9, p. 7).  
This was particularly important to the Army because it decreased the IBCT 
sustainment and training requirements.  Additionally, the Army emphasized the 
GDLS advantages in protection, vehicle speed, and sustainment cost.    
The GM/GDLS based its materiel solution on the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) 
III, an 8 x 8, wheeled, armored vehicle.  GM/GDLS centered all ten versions of the 
IAV on the LAV III design, and each had unique mission equipment packages.  The 
LAV III offered a common armored hull, suspension, power pack, drivetrain and 
associated system (GDLS, 2002, p. 5). 
Although the MGS shared the basic chassis with the other nine versions, the 
Army considered it a separate variant because it required additional developmental 
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the “MGS will take the longest [to develop] as it is closest to a full development” 
(Federal News Service, 2000).  The Army initially estimated that the MGS would 
require approximately two years of developmental work, based on the GM/GDLS 
proposal.  The Army acknowledged that MGS would require integration efforts, but it 
underplayed this by stating that it did not entail “new guns, sights, or sensor 
packages for this equipment” (Federal News Service, 2000).  The Army considered 
an extended developmental program, defined as greater than 24 months, as counter 
to the Army’s Transformation strategy and early fielding of Interim Brigade Combat 
Teams.  Consequently, the Army urged each of the offerors to consider carefully the 
“probability of success” for meeting the 24-month timeline with their variant 
proposals (Kern, 2000, p. 12).  In this regard, LTG Kern acknowledged that the 
GDLS MGS schedule was “substantially inferior” to that of the UDLP variant, but he 
did not view this as unacceptable (Gamboa, 2001, April 9, p. 7). 
At the close of the contract award announcement, LTG Kern also stated that 
there was heavy pressure from higher authority to push for a shorter schedule to 
enable a full operational capability for the Interim Brigade Combat Team.  He said: 
[Y]ou talk to all of our military’s bosses in the Army, General Shinseki, [they 
say that] we’re too slow.  This has been a remarkable trip for all of us, to go 
from a concept about a year ago.  From their perspective [they say], “we 
[materiel developers] aren’t moving fast enough,” rather than “why didn’t we 
wait.”  We have a capability, which we are trying to get to the field as quickly 
as possible because it does not exist today. (Federal News Service, 2000) 
Although the tracked option proposed by United Defense offered an option 
that required little developmental work and a faster schedule at a lower cost, the 
Army made a trade-off based on the limited amount of available information from the 
PPD and the contractor proposals. 
It seems apparent that the Army intended to make the best decision that it 
could with the limited time and information available rather than make a perfect 
decision.  Given the information available from the PPD and other market research 
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the GDLS variants, particularly the MGS, could quickly mature.  It is also interesting 
to note that within the Acquisition Strategy Report for the Interim Armored Vehicle, 
published in March 2000, the Army identified the integration of mission equipment on 
the ICV as the primary technical risk area (PM BCT, 2000, p. 24).  Yet this report did 
not discuss the technical risk of integrating the more complex components on the 
MGS or NBCRV, both of which encountered significant challenges with systems 
integration (2000, p. 24).        
2. Award Protest  
Soon after the contract award, United Defense, the unsuccessful offeror of 
the M-113 ICV variant and the M-8 AGS variant, filed a protest.  The General 
Accounting Office upheld the decision to award the contract to GM/GDLS, and it 
found that the Army’s selection of the GM/GDLS ICV and MGS was reasonable 
(Gamboa, 2001, April 9, p. 7).  Within the UDLP award protest, there was 
considerable discussion on system reliability—a significant problem later 
encountered with the GDLS MGS. However, the focus of the reliability debate 
centered on the vehicle chassis, not the unique Mission Equipment Packages 
(MEP).  It is noteworthy that the GDLS MGS was viewed as having significantly 
superior predicted reliability over the UDLP MGS, mainly because the metric for 
comparison was Mean Miles Between Critical Failures (MMBCF).  The use of this 
metric did not truly address the uncertainty of the unproven Aries ammunition 
handling system (AHS) that the GDLS MGS employed.    
The award protest delayed what was already a highly compressed schedule 
by 126 days, and it slowed the program’s momentum (Michael Viggato, Deputy PEO 
GCS, personal communication, December 12, 2008).  The Army eventually initiated 
work on the GM/GDLS contract on April 9, 2001 (Hinton, 2001, p. 13).         
H. Conclusion 
Despite the protest, the Army successfully initiated the first stage of General 
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Shinseki announced his vision, the Army conducted a series of difficult tasks that 
included the IAV requirements document, PPD & market research, RFP, and source 
selection.  While not a perfect process, the view was that the Army could make 
necessary adjustments as necessary rather than seek an optimal solution at the 
expense of time.      
The Army demonstrated a willingness to accept some development on the 
GDLS version of the MGS because of the advantages it offered in commonality and 
performance.  The Army perceived that the GDLS variant of the MGS was close to 
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IV. The Development of the Mobile Gun System 
A. Introduction   
As one of the Army’s top acquisition priorities, the Stryker had the full support 
of the Army’s senior leadership as well as dedicated fiscal resources, but it also 
faced the pressures of a time-based acquisition strategy.  Unlike other programs, the 
Stryker consisted of both developmental and non-developmental variants that were 
under the same acquisition strategy.   
The Army immediately fielded eight of the Stryker’s variants, while two 
variants required additional development (MGS and NBCRV).  The Army knew that 
these platforms required the integration of multiple components, and they were 
operating under the assumption that the MGS would require approximately two 
years to field (Federal News Service, 2000).  At the time of the contract award 
announcement, this meant that the MGS would complete its development in July 
2003.   
Coincidentally, this was the same time that the Stryker’s “product champion,” 
General Eric Shinseki, would end his four-year tenure as the Army’s Chief of Staff.  
Although this two-year estimate proved to be unachievable, it provided a sense of 
urgency to the program.  The Army continued to push for the rapid development of 
the MGS because it deemed the MGS as “critical” to meeting the expectations of the 
combatant commanders (Schuster, 2002, May, p. 19).   
As one of the two developmental variants, the MGS encountered a series of 
unique challenges; this chapter provides an overview of the MGS development.  The 
chapter discusses the MGS Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD) 
contract, its characteristics, system requirements, and development events leading 
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B. MGS Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD) 
Contract 
The Army selected the GDLS MGS model primarily because of its 
advantages in commonality and performance, with commonality being the 
“overriding factor” (Gamboa, 2001, April 9, p. 7).  However, during the source-
selection process, the Source Selection Case Authority (SSA) believed that the 
GDLS MGS model presented some schedule risk.  In fact, the SSA understood that 
GDLS “understated” its schedule and that the schedule was “inconsistent with the 
fundamental terms of the solicitation” (2001, April 9, p. 7). 
In reference to the RFP, the government clearly stated that the program’s 
objectives may be achieved through “the acquisition of off-the-shelf, non-
developmental items with integration of components, traditional development, [and] 
systems integration […] staggered over time and across variants” (Gamboa, 2001, 
April 9, p. 7).  However, the RFP stipulated that the Army understood that such an 
effort should stay within the intent of fielding a system in a timely manner. “[The 
Government] does not anticipate a lengthy development program and considers 
extensive development of solutions to be counter to the thrust of this acquisition due 
to the time, cost and risk associated with such an approach” (Gamboa, 2001, April 9, 
p. 7). 
The Army awarded GDLS a cost-reimbursement contract for EMD that 
included eight preproduction vehicles for Production Qualification Testing (PQT).  
The EMD contract used performance-based specifications, and it did not call out the 
use of a systems engineering process in the statement of work (SOW) (N. Jenny 
Chang, Tank & Automotive Command Reliability Engineer, personal communication, 
March 3, 2009).  At this point, the government was unable to use any military 
specifications or standards unless the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) approved 
a waiver.  Additionally, the MGS did not contain a “design-in” approach for reliability 
as a requirement in the contract, and this ensured the use of a “test-in” approach 
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personal communication, March 3, 2009).  The EMD contract did not require GDLS 
to conduct any contractor testing prior to delivery to the government due to time 
constraints and because Program Executive Office Ground Combat System (PEO 
GCS) believed that the MGS was close to ready (Michael Viggato, Deputy PEO 
GCS, personal communication, December 12, 2008).  The abbreviated development 
period necessitated the use of concurrent contractor and government testing with 
the hope that the vehicles would fare well (Kim McCormick, GDLS PM MGS, 
personal communication, January 22, 2009).  
C. MGS Characteristics and Requirements 
The MGS retained the same common armored hull, suspension, power pack, 
and drivetrain as the ICV variant of the Stryker.  Fully combat loaded (without any 
additional armor), the MGS weighs approximately 47,500 pounds, and a three-man 
crew consisting of a vehicle commander, gunner, and driver operate the vehicle 
(GDLS, 2002, p. 7) (see Figure 5).   
 
Figure 5. Mobile Gun System Characteristics  
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A Caterpillar 3126A-HEUI diesel engine that uses an Allison MD 3066 
automatic transmission powers the MGS, and it has the option of operating in either 
the 8 x 4 or the 8 x 8 mode.  The MGS integrates a Low Profile Turret that houses a 
similar 105mm main gun, the M-68A2, as the early version of the M-1 tank.  The 
secondary armament consists of a coaxially mounted 7.62mm machine gun and a 
commander’s M-2 .50 caliber machine gun (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Exterior View of the Stryker Mobile Gun System  
(GDLS, 2002, p. 8) 
The remainder of this section describes the MGS role within the SBCT; it also 
describes the system requirements in terms of firepower, survivability, and the 
command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR).   
1. MGS Requirements  
Prior to General Shinseki’s announcement in 1999 of his vision for the Interim 
Force, the Army’s user community began work on a requirements document for a 
medium-force.  The user community used the insights from the PPD to refine their 
requirements, and it completed the IAV ORD in March 2000 (PM SBCT, 2008, slide 
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Milestone B, and it went for approval by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
(JROC) in February 2004 (Andrews, 2004, slide 13).  The JROC has a significant 
oversight role in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).   
The JROC encourages collaboration between the services, ensures that the 
services develop capabilities in the joint warfighting paradigm, reviews the 
requirements of programs that may have a joint interest or impact, and validates Key 
Performance Parameters (KPPs) (CJCS, 2007a, May, p. 2).   As of 2008, the Stryker 
Capabilities Development Document (CDD) was expected to receive JROC approval 
in 2009 (Fahey, 2008, slide 42).  The CDD identifies operational performance 
attributes of the proposed system or increment KPPs; it is a required document for a 
program’s Milestone B review (CJCS, 2007b, May, p. B-1). 
Originally, the Stryker’s user proponent, the Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) System Manager (TSM), was located at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and it 
served as the coordinating organization for the Stryker’s requirements.  In 2002, the 
Army transferred the user proponent to Fort Benning, Georgia (the home of the 
Army’s Infantry Center), and it became known as TSM SBCT.  In 2007, the Army re-
designated TSM SBCT as a TRADOC Capability Manager (TCM), and it was 
renamed TCM SBCT.  Each of the Army’s branch proponents provides input to TCM 
SBCT on the Stryker’s Mission Equipment Packages (MEPs).  The Armor Center, 
located at Fort Knox, Kentucky, provided input for the MGS MEP.       
2. The Role of the MGS within the SBCT  
The MGS provides a medium-infantry support capability to the SBCT 
Combined Arms Company, and it complements the nine other Stryker variants.  The 
ORD describes the critical nature of the MGS: 
The MGS is essential in setting and maintaining the tactical conditions for this 
collective overmatch by providing the capability to rapidly and in succession 
engage and destroy a diversity of stationary and mobile threat personnel, 
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spectrum of munitions with lethal effects under all weather and visibility 
conditions. (Federation of American Scientists, 2000)  
The MGS Annex of the ORD states that the “principal function of the MGS is 
to provide rapid and lethal direct fires to support assaulting infantry” (Federation of 
American Scientists, 2000).   
3. Firepower  
The primary requirement of the MGS is to provide the infantry with supporting 
fires (also a KPP), particularly with destroying enemy bunkers and sniper positions.  
With its 105mm main gun, the MGS is required to defeat a threat infantry squad at a 
minimum distance of 50 meters and at a maximum distance of 500 meters.  The 
MGS also has to deliver this lethal fire with precision against fighting positions in 
buildings and light structures.  Although it was required to destroy a variety of 
vehicles ranging from light-skin trucks to T-62 tanks, the ORD stipulated this be for 
self-defense only.  The main gun can depress to -5 degrees, elevate to +15 degrees 
over the front of the vehicle, and +9 degrees over the rear of the vehicle (Federation 
of American Scientists, 2000).  The turret and main gun is powered with an electric 
drive system similar to that of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, with both stabilized and 
non-stabilized modes as well as a manual back-up (Federation of American 
Scientists, 2000). 
The MGS has an M-240C 7.62mm coaxially mounted machine gun on the left 
side of the main gun that can accurately engage threat troops at a maximum 
effective range of 900 meters.  The M-240C elevates and depresses with the main 
gun and, therefore, has the same elevation and depression requirements as the 
main gun.  Both the commander and gunner control the main gun and coaxially 
mounted machine gun.  The MGS also stores 18 main gun rounds, with all 18 in a 
ready configuration (Gary Gerlach, Project Engineer, PEO GCS, personal 
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The fire control system supporting the main gun and coaxial machine gun 
provides day and night engagement capability in all types of weather.  The Compact 
Modular Sight (CMS) provides a forward-looking infrared sight (FLIR), eye-safe laser 
range finder (ELRF), and direct view optics (Gary Gerlach, Project Engineer, PEO 
GCS, personal communication, January 20, 2009).   
4. Survivability  
The crew of the MGS has the same level of protection and survivability as the 
ICV variants.  The base armor of the Stryker is required to provide 360-degree 
protection against 7.62mm fire and 14.5mm protection with additional armor 
protection.   
The initial requirements for the MGS did not stipulate the use of armor 
protection for the main gun or coaxial machine, although it did require full protection 
for the crew inside of the turret.  To protect the three-man crew from a secondary 
explosion of the main gun’s ammunition, the MGS stores the main gun ammunition 
separately from the crew (TRADOC, 2008, p. 19).   
5. C4ISR  
The C4ISR requirements on the MGS are similar to those on the ICV variants.  
As part of the SBCT, the MGS can rapidly share, understand, and network 
information to achieve a common operating picture (TRADOC, 2008, p. 6).  The 
networking capability of the Stryker allows the SBCT to span a larger area than 
Legacy formations and to respond in a rapid manner to changes in the operating 
environment.   
The networking capability is particularly important to the MGS.  The ability of 
the MGS to receive information from other Stryker platforms and infantrymen allows 
it to provide long-range, precision firepower.  The MGS also has the same level of 
interoperability with current C4ISR suites as the ICV variants.  The C4ISR system 
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 Intercom System, 
 Radio System,  
 Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System, 
 Ethernet Hub, 
 Ground Positioning System, 
 Driver’s Vision Enhancer (DVE), 
 Training Aids Devices Simulators and Simulations (TADSS), and 
 Embedded Training Computer (ETC). (GDLS, 2002, p. 14) 
The radio system consists of two Single Channel Ground Air Radio Systems 
(SINCGARS) radios (long-range and short-range) and an EPLRS radio.  The FBCB2 
system communicates through the EPLRS, and the GPS provides the FBCB2 with 
positional data (GDLS, 2002, p. 14).  
D. MGS Development  
As of June 2009, the MGS was nearing the end of its developmental period.  
For the purpose of this case study, one can view its development in four overlapping 
stages.  Chronologically, these stages are selection, protest and prototype 
development (2000–2002), early testing (2003), reliability growth (2004–2006), and 
deployment and the path to full-rate production (Fall 2006–2009).  The focus of the 
case study is on the reliability growth period from 2004–2006; however, a clear 
understanding of the events leading up to this period is essential.   
The early stages of the MGS followed a turbulent cycle of development until 
the MGS PMO instituted the use of systems engineering methodology to integrate all 
of the program’s activities.  Prior to the implementation of the systems engineering 
approach, the program experienced a turbulent development period.  The Army 
deployed the MGS to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2007, where it received positive 
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1. Stage 1–Selection, Protest, and Prototype Development (2000–2002)   
During the November 2000 Stryker Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 
meeting, the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) required successful completion of 
six exit criteria for the MGS prior to its entrance into Low-rate Initial Production 
(LRIP) (PM SBCT, 2008, slide 34) (see Figure 7).     
 
Figure 7. EMD Exit Criteria  
(PM SBCT, 2008, slide 34) 
Soon after the start of work for the contract in April 2001, GDLS initiated the 
production of the eight preproduction MGS models.  In July 2002, the MGS PMO 
believed that the program required 27 months of development prior to Low-rate 
Initial Production (LRIP) in June 2003 (Hsu, 2002, July 22).  The initial LRIP was 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 56 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
The development of the eight preproduction models took place at the General 
Dynamics Muskegon Technology Center in Michigan.  The Muskegon Technology 
Center provided GDLS with the capabilities needed to handcraft eight vehicles for 
Production Qualification Testing (PQT).  In March 1996, GDLS purchased the 
Muskegon Technology Center from the Teledyne-Waterpik Corporation; the facility 
specialized in the development of handcrafted armored vehicle prototypes (LTC 
Shane Fullmer, personal communication, February 27, 2009).  Additionally, 
Teledyne-Waterpik’s Muskegon technology facility was the original designer of the 
Low Profile Turret (LPT) for the LAV III, and it had the engineering expertise to 
develop these vehicles for the Army (LTC Erik Webb, personal communication, 
December 5, 2008).   
However, the processes of the Muskegon facility concentrated on handcrafted 
research and development activities, not on production (Kim McCormick, GDLS PM 
MGS, personal communication, January 22, 2009).  The engineers at Muskegon had 
previously worked with the Aries auto-loader portion of the ammunition handling 
system, and, as a result, they were confident that they could successfully integrate 
the replenisher as well.  The mindset of the engineers at Muskegon was that they 
could accomplish anything given enough time (LTC Shane Fullmer, personal 
communication, February 27, 2009).   
In July 2002, the Army received its first pre-production model, but PQT would 
not begin until November 2002.  The MGS prototypes differed from the 
demonstration version used during the 2000 PPD in that they had: 
 Increased armor protection, 
 An integrated C4ISR suite, 
 An integrated ten-round replenisher, 
 A 7.62mm coaxial machine gun, 
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 A commander’s panoramic viewer integrated with the fire control 
system, 
 An eight-round carousel as opposed to a nine-round version, and 
 Fire control modification to integrate all main gun ammunition and 
coaxial machine guns. (Gourley, 2003, May) 
The initial preproduction vehicles received in July 2002 did not contain the 
entire AHS.  These vehicles had the auto-loader system but lacked the replenisher, 
which GDLS did not deliver until September.  Even then, it took over a month to get 
the replenisher to line up a round to feed into the auto-loader system’s carousel 
located in the Low Profile Turret (LTC Shane Fullmer, personal communication, 
February 27, 2009).  Several individuals in the MGS PMO immediately realized that 
the Aries AHS design would present problems, but the extent of these problems was 
uncertain until the test community verified them during PQT (LTC Shane Fullmer, 
personal communication, February 27, 2009).  The PM planned for the PQT to 
support a scheduled Low-rate Initial Production (LRIP) decision in June 2003.  In 
late 2001, the Army planned to field the MGS to the first SBCT in 2005 (see Figure 
8). 
The first set of challenges that the MGS PMO anticipated was the vehicle’s 
weight.  To meet the C-130 Transportability KPP, the MGS’s PQT weight limit was 
40,592 pounds, and the initial prototypes were approximately 43,865 pounds.  
Although the MGS was overweight by 5,000 pounds, the Army continued with the 
June 2003 LRIP decision because it had a two-stage weight reduction program in 
place to ensure the MGS met the C-130 KPP (Winograd, 2002, November 25). 
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Figure 8. MGS Program Schedule Adjustments April 2001–January 2002  
(PM SBCT, 2008, slide 45) 
2. Stage 2–Early Testing (2003)  
The Army began its PQT at Aberdeen Proving Ground in February 2003.  
Soon after PQT began, the Army was disappointed with the mounting problems 
found in the MGS prototypes.  The intent of the PQT was to provide system-level 
testing to determine the stability of the design and its readiness for production. This 
meant that the failure modes should have been known and consistent; however, new 
failure modes were frequently appearing (LTC Erik Webb, personal communication, 
March 10, 2009).  This indicated that the design was unstable and that it needed 
sub-component testing.  First, the MGS showed 50 problems with human systems 
integration, known as Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT), and it had 
to reconfigure much of the C4ISR components to allow soldiers to fit and function 
inside the vehicle.  Second, the Army noticed a problem with the ammunition 
handling system (AHS).  The AHS had difficulty reloading ammunition because of 
the alignment between the replenisher and the carousel (Baumgardner, 2003, May 
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Transportability KPP, the blast overpressure from the main gun muzzle brake was 
causing a halo effect on the front of the vehicle, damaging components mounted to 
the external hull (Joseph Godell, Deputy PM MGS, personal communication, March 
6, 2009).   
The engineering effort involved in lowering the turret caused the Army to 
suspend PQT for two months (Joseph Godell, Deputy PM MGS, personal 
communication, January 6, 2009).  GDLS determined that the recoil mechanism 
could absorb the additional recoil without any redesign, beyond the elimination of the 
muzzle brake (Joseph Godell, Deputy PM MGS, personal communication, January 
8, 2009).  The PQT began again in July 2003, and the Army completed it in 
November 2003.  These engineering issues led to the rescheduling of LRIP to 
February 2004 and then to September 2004.    
Despite the problems encountered during PQT, the Army was satisfied with 
the GDLS fixes to the MANPRINT problems, main gun overpressure and recoil, and 
the AHS.  The Army then proceeded to the LRIP decision in September 2004.  To 
meet the criteria for LRIP, the MGS had to meet all of its Key Performance 
Parameters (KPPs) to include the C-130 KPP, the vehicle cost objective, and a 
requirement to achieve 1,000 mean miles between system abort (half of the 
requirement of the ICV) (Roosevelt, 2004, August 11).  The Army defined system 
abort as any type of significant system failure that occurred on the vehicle.  Of the 
six exit criteria, the system abort requirement was the most ambiguous because it 
did not clearly define the minimal reliability requirement for the auto-loader system.   
The Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), Michael Wynne, chaired the 
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) meeting that determined the LRIP decision.  The 
DAB made a determination based on the analysis of the test results from the 
Director of Operational Testing & Evaluation (DOT&E) and the Army Test and 
Evaluation Command (ATEC).  The analysis stated that the MGS met the 
requirements for operational effectiveness, but fell short of meeting the minimum 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 60 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
2004, p. 1).  At the DAB meeting, Wynne expressed substantial concern over the 
reliability of the MGS, but he still approved the limited LRIP of 14 vehicles with 
several caveats.  His doubts centered on the ammunition handling system, and he 
required the Army to update the Stryker Systems Engineering Plan (SEP) within 90 
days (Joseph Godell, Deputy PM MGS, personal communication, January 6, 2009).  
It was at this point that the Army began to adjust its expectations for the MGS.  
Rewriting the SEP would entail a complete review of the design and the approach 
towards improving reliability.        
After the September 2004 DAB meeting, the MGS PMO became acutely 
aware that the development of the MGS would require even more time than was 
expected—as well as additional patience (DiMascio, 2004, October 11).  As the 
schedule of the MGS continued to slip, elements of the user community 
compounded the technical problems caused by the auto-loader’s reliability when 
they changed the requirements for the armor protection of the MGS (DiMascio, 
2004, October 11).    
3. Stage 3–Reliability Growth (2004–2005)  
While the ICV chassis that the MGS used was highly reliable, the low inherent 
reliability of the Mission Equipment Package (MEP) reduced the overall reliability of 
the MGS.  Failure data collected during PQT pointed towards the three components 
that made up the AHS as the major cause for poor MEP reliability and, in particular, 
the AHS replenisher (Joseph Godell, Deputy PM MGS, personal communication, 
January 6, 2009).   
The difference between the actual reliability of less than 20 rounds per 
Operational Mission Scenario/Mission Profile (OMS/MP) cycle and the required 
reliability of at least 90 rounds per mission cycle without a failure was 
significant, and this required tremendous persistence and innovation to remedy (LTC 
Erik Webb, personal communication, May 20, 2009).  Both the Army and GDLS 
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MEP, and this required a costly and extensive reengineering effort that led to a 
change in the schedule (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Stryker MGS Program Comparison Schedule  
(April 2001 and August 2005)  
(PM SBCT, 2008, slide 49)  
The problems with the auto-loader caused GDLS to abandon its original auto-
loader design, developed by Aries, and instead use a contractor-initiated source 
selection to choose a new sub-contractor, Western Design, which proposed a more 
reliable design (Joseph Godell, Deputy PM MGS, personal communication, January 
6, 2009).  The MGS PMO employed a Reliability Growth Analysis (RGA) 
methodology based on systems engineering to provide the program leadership with 
the information needed to make decisions on resourcing and scheduling (Chang & 
Rohall, 2008, September, p. 267).  The MGS PMO encountered the problem of 
testing for numerical reliability targets midway through development, when reliable 
systems are often the result of the early use of systems engineering fundamentals 
(Defense Science Board, 2008, May, p. 5).  The use of systems engineering 
uncovers problems at an early stage, when the program can incrementally correct 
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While the reliability issues were occurring, the Army’s user community and 
the Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E), under the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), made the determination that the MGS PMO needed to 
increase the gun pod’s armor protection based on modeling and simulation of future 
tactical scenarios.  The additional capabilities requested by the user community and 
the OSD required additions to the updated MGS TEMP, as well as further 
reengineering effort.  The increase in armor protection required trade-offs in 
capabilities to ensure that the MGS met the C-130 KPP.  The MGS PMO now faced 
the issue of improving the MGS reliability and gun pod survivability while 
concurrently maintaining an acceptable system weight (DiMascio, 2005, January 
24).     
The new auto-loader contractor, Western Design, replaced the replenisher to 
reduce the complexity of the auto-loading and replenishing mechanisms.  The 
Aries replenisher had consisted of two five-round drums, whereas the Western 
Design replenisher consisted of one ten-round drum.  After several months of 
intensive RGA effort as part of the test program, the reliability of the system was 
approaching the necessary parameters.  Consequently, the new DAE, Ken Krieg, 
approved the final LRIP of 58 vehicles in October 2005 after reviewing the new 
operational suitability test results (DiMascio, 2005, November 14).  Although 
reliability growth was not the final development hurdle for the MGS, it opened the 
way for the LRIP decision.   
The use of the RGA and systems engineering process provided the MGS 
Program Office with an objective means of understanding what was occurring with 
the MGS during testing.  By 2006, the MGS was exceeding its reliability targets. 
4. Stage 4–Deployment and the Path to Full-rate Production (2006–2008) 
After production approval for the remaining 58 LRIP vehicles, the MGS 
Program conducted additional Production Verification Testing (PVT), beginning in 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 63 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Milestone III decision for Full-rate Production (FRP), scheduled for 2007 (DiMascio, 
2005, December 12).  To meet the Milestone III requirements, the MGS also had to 
undergo Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) and an Initial Operational Test (IOT).    
Although the Army had a Full-rate Production decision scheduled for 2007, 
the Iraq Surge diverted the Fort Lewis-based test unit, the 4th Stryker Brigade 
Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division, a unit that the Army had previously 
scheduled to support the MGS IOT.  The Army subsequently rescheduled the Full-
rate Production decision for February 2008 after it designated another SBCT as the 
IOT support unit (Joseph Godell, Deputy PM MGS, personal communication, 
January 6, 2009).   
While the MGS still required LFT&E and operational testing, the Chief of Staff 
of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, determined that the MGS was capable of 
operational deployment with the 4th SBCT/2nd ID to Iraq.  He based this decision on 
the recommendation from the December 2006 Army System Acquisition Review 
Council (ASARC) (Joseph Godell, Deputy PM MGS, personal communication, 
January 8, 2009).  Although the Army acknowledged that the MGS required “fixes” 
during its deployment, the vehicle successfully performed its mission in theater 
(Joseph Godell, Deputy PM MGS, personal communication, January 8, 2009). 
To resolve these concerns, the MGS PMO and GDLS implemented accuracy 
improvements to the coaxial machine gun, reliability fixes to the electronic power 
components, a better cooling system for the vehicle’s three-man crew, and software 
improvements to the commander’s display unit (Censer, 2008, May 19).  To address 
these issues, the MGS PMO developed a near-, mid- and far-term plan to implement 
the fixes recommended by the DOT&E to allow FRP of the MGS.  The Army then 
conducted a Configuration Steering Board (CSB) in October 2008 to review the 
product manager’s mitigation plan and the impacts of implementing the changes on 
cost and schedule (Roosevelt, 2008, August 22, p. 1).  The recommended fixes 
included both requirements shortfalls from the base MGS requirement document, 
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testing that were not traceable to an approved requirements document (COL Robert 
Schumitz, PM SBCT, personal communication, January 29, 2009).   
E. Conclusion 
While the MGS program offers a useful case study for lessons learned, the 
developmental challenges encountered were not idiosyncratic to this program.  The 
Army has encountered similar problems with complexity in other acquisition 
programs.  In fact, a GAO report on the SGT York, an air defense weapon system 
developed in the early 1980s, revealed this:   
One reason for the delay in fielding the (system) was that the prototype gun 
systems the contractors delivered for testing were less technically mature 
than anticipated.  This caused testing delays and the need for more testing 
than had been planned.  The integration of the weapon’s major subsystems 
and their application to a weapon for which they had not been originally 
designed apparently represented a greater technical undertaking than 
originally anticipated. (Conahan, 1986, pp. 4-5) 
Outside of the MGS program, there was tremendous support for the MGS.  
General Peter Schoomaker, the Army’s Chief of Staff after General Shinseki, was a 
“stalwart supporter” of the MGS (DiMascio, 2005, January 24).  This chapter 
provided a broad overview of what capability the Army needed from the MGS, as 
well as a chronological progression of how it evolved from 2000 to 2008.   
The focus of Chapter V is on the MGS development from 2000–2005, with an 
emphasis on how the MGS program adapted to the complexity of the outer 
environment by analyzing the system’s integration of the ammunition handling 
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V. Managing Complexity 
A. Introduction 
A program’s developmental trajectory is seldom smooth, and it typically 
involves overcoming unanticipated challenges.  Chapter IV provided a brief 
description of some of the developmental challenges that the MGS encountered.  In 
many ways, everything was harder than expected for the MGS, particularly with 
systems integration (COL Robert Schumitz, PM SBCT, personal communication, 
November 25, 2008).  The initial momentum of the program and the commitment to 
success by the program’s leadership overcame some of these challenges, but the 
MGS required a change in approach to make it through the crisis period of 2004-
2005.  The crisis occurred because of an inability to meet reliability objectives for 
LRIP, but the root cause of the crisis was an approach that did not adequately 
address the complex environment.  To meet the demands of the complex 
environment, the MGS PMO self-organized around a systems approach that 
identified and managed risk.   
The primary area of risk for the program during this period was the low level 
of reliability for the MGS ammunition handling system (AHS).  This chapter provides 
an overview of the AHS, the problems experienced with the AHS, the systems 
engineering approach adopted by the MGS PMO and GDLS, and then closes with 
an analysis of the program’s adaptation to the complex environment.        
B. The Ammunition Handling System 
1. Aries Design   
Early on, GDLS sub-contracted with the Aries Company for a previously 
developed AHS under a fixed-price contract (LTC Shane Fullmer, personal 
communication, February 27, 2009).  Aries had an off-the-shelf auto-loader 
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the MGS, the AHS consisted of three components: 1) a carousel, 2) a rammer, and 
3) a replenisher (see Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10. The Ammunition Handling System  
(GDLS, 2005c, slide 3) 
The Aries design used pneumatic power, and it had eight rounds in the 
carousel, with ten rounds in two separate 5-round drums.  When commanded to load 
a round, the eight-round carousel raised the 12 o'clock position tube 
containing the desired round; the hydraulically actuated rammer picked up 
the round from the carousel and transferred it to the gun breach, where it 
was loaded (LTC Erik Webb, personal communication, May 20, 2009).  To reload 
the carousel, rounds were pneumatically loaded into the carousel located in the Low 
Profile Turret (GDLS, 2005b, slide 3).   There were early indications that the AHS 
was problematic.  Soon after the delivery of the first pre-production vehicles in 2002, 
the Army noticed that the Aries AHS had difficulty with aligning rounds while 
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2. Reliability in Early PQT (2003)   
The requirement for reliability at the start of the program was 1,000 Mean 
Miles Between System Abort (MMBSA) (Chang et al., 2009, March, p. 3).  The 
MMBSA measure was based on the performance specifications within the RFP, 
which required the developer to state reliability in terms of “system abort failures” 
(Gamboa, 2001, April 9, p. 17).  Furthermore, the RFP required offerors to “identify 
predicted or demonstrated system level reliability for each IAV variant or 
configuration and to discuss failure definition, data sources, and operating 
environment profile showing applicability to the IAVs” (Gamboa, 2001, April 9, p. 17).  
As part of the proposal package, the government required each of the offerors, 
GDLS in this case, to assess its own predicted reliability in view of the risks 
associated with integrating highly complex components.  Considering the 
performance of the AHS during PQT, it appears that GDLS overestimated the 
reliability of the AHS.   
In 2003, the Army conducted Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability 
(RAM) testing as part of PQT at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds.  During this testing, 
the Army required the vehicles to drive 8,000 miles and fire 640 rounds with the goal 
of achieving an 80% confidence level that the production system could achieve 
1,000 MMBSA (Baumgardner, 2003, July 10, p. 1).  The AHS failed to achieve the 
required system-level reliability, and the Army terminated PQT approximately two-
thirds of the way through the test (Chang et al., 2008, September, p. 269).     
The MGS PMO relied on a “test-in” approach for reliability because there was 
not a Design for Reliability (DFR) requirement in the original contract, and the 
compressed timeline made it nearly impossible for GDLS to conduct DFR during 
EMD (N. Jenny Chang, Tank & Automotive Command Reliability Engineer, personal 
communication, March 4, 2009).  During PQT, the MGS PMO used a closed-loop 
Failure Reporting and Corrective Action System (FRACAS) that did not provide an 
efficient means for reliability growth because of a slow reaction time in identifying 
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reaction time was that reliability at the end of the PQT was essentially the same as 
the reliability at the beginning (N. Jenny Chang, Tank & Automotive Command 
Reliability Engineer, personal communication, March 4, 2009).   
Based on these results, a September 2004 Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 
review required the MGS PMO to improve the reliability of the system prior to 
moving to LRIP.  Under the post-DAB testing plan, the DAE required that the MGS 
undergo further RAM tests in FY04 and 1Q/FY05.  These RAM tests included driving 
12,000 miles and firing 1,000 rounds, with the objective of achieving the 1,000 
MMBSA (DiMascio, 2004, September 13).  One outcome of the September 2004 
DAB was that the MGS PMO and GDLS separated the reliability criterion for the 
MGS MEP from that of the chassis.  The measurement criterion for reliability 
originates from two contractual documents created by the user: the Operational 
Mode Summary and Mission Profile (OMS/MP) and the Failure Definition and 
Scoring Criteria (FD/SC) (Chang et al., 2009, March, p. 154). 
The OMS/MP is an appendix to the system requirements documentation. The 
purpose of the OMS/MP is to support the development of specifications and test 
plans by describing how a system will operate in different types of scenarios (DAU, 
2009a). The FD/SC is a jointly developed document between the user and the 
materiel developer that defines system failure definitions during reliability testing 
(DAU, 2009b).  Within the Stryker OMS/MP, the MGS performed two functions: 
accumulating miles and firing ammunition. However, the reliability criteria was 
changed because the MGS chassis was the same as the ICV variant—which 
already passed its reliability tests—and the cause of the MGS reliability shortfalls 
centered on the AHS (Chang et al., 2009, March, 154).   
The result of this change was that MGS PMO kept the requirement for the 
MMBSA at 1,000 miles, and that it re-designated the new MEP reliability as Mean 
Rounds Between System Abort (MRBSA)—with a threshold performance of 81 
MRBSA and an objective performance of 148 MRBSA (Chang et al., 2009, March, p. 
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and to find a new design for the AHS, as well as a new approach to improving the 
system reliability.   
C. Reliability as a Design Consideration during the Systems 
Engineering Process 
As a requirement, system reliability is an important design consideration 
throughout the systems engineering process, and it plays a critical role in a system’s 
lifecycle.  According to Blanchard and Fabrycky, 
Every system is developed in response to a customer need to fulfill some 
anticipated function.  The effectiveness with which the system fulfills this 
function is the ultimate measure of its utility and value to the customer […]. 
[S]ystem effectiveness is a composite of many factors with reliability being a 
major contributor. (2006, p. 285)   
After conducting a functional analysis, the developer constructs a reliability 
block diagram that allocates reliability from a top-down approach.  The allocation of 
reliability also serves as an input for Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006, p. 385).  Through the application of a 
systems engineering approach, the materiel developer designs for reliability (DFR), 
as opposed to testing for reliability (TFR) as an afterthought.  Although the DFR 
approach requires sophisticated methodology, it is more cost-effective than the TFR 
approach.  As a critical element of a system’s overall performance, the developer 
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Figure 11. Systems Engineering Lifecycle Model with Reliability Embedded  
(Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006, p. 383) 
According to the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) Reliability 
Growth Guide, the consideration of reliability “is part of the systems engineering 
process,” and systems engineering is merely a means of “viewing reliability program 
activities in an integrated manner” (2000, September, p. 4).  The different reliability 
activities include design predictions, apportionment, failure modes and effects 
analysis, and stress analysis (2000, September, p. 4).   
In short, reliability growth is a proven method to reduce failures by testing an 
item until failure modes or events occur, identifying the failures, and then fixing them.  
Reliability growth is an iterative design process, with five essential elements that 
include: 1) detection of failure sources, 2) feedback of problems identified, 3) 
redesign effort based on problems identified, 4) fabrication of hardware, and 5) 
verification of redesign effort (see Figure 12).  The rate of reliability growth hinges on 
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effectiveness of the redesign effort, with any of these activities acting as a 
“bottleneck” to the overall reliability of the system (AMSAA, 2000, September, pp. 5-
6).   
 
Figure 12. Reliability Growth Feedback Model with Hardware  
(AMSAA, 2000, September, p. 5) 
The key element to achieving a sufficient rate of growth is through 
improvements to a system’s inherent reliability (Chang et al., 2008, September, p. 
270).  Inherent reliability is the element of reliability that materiel developers have 
control over, and it refers to the designed reliability of the system while operating 
under realistic operating conditions.  The objective of materiel developers is to 
increase a system’s inherent reliability during the design phase and to minimize 
unforeseen problems during system testing.  In the case of MGS, the Muskegon 
Technology Center handcrafted the components together, but there was not enough 
time for contractor systems integration testing.  In effect, the first two years of the 
MGS development consisted of trial-and-error tests for reliability.  
D. Program Actions 
Based on the failure to pass reliability standards during PQT, the MGS PMO 
initiated a reliability growth plan.  After receiving the guidance of the September 
2004 DAB, the MGS PMO developed a new path forward that included a phased 
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 Phase I: Additional Reliability Testing (ART), 
 Phase II: Systems Engineering Revitalization, Management and 
Process Improvements, and 
 Phase III: Redesign of the Ammunition Handling System. (PM 
SBCT, 2006, p. 59) 
The MGS PMO also developed a Phase IV plan that emphasized survivability 
improvements to the Low Profile Turret; however, that topic is beyond the scope of 
this case study. 
 
Figure 13. Schedule for Phase I-III  
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1. Phase I: Additional Reliability Testing (ART)   
Phase I served as a time to regroup and establish a new baseline for the 
program.  Prior to ART, GDLS conducted a “contractor shakedown” to ensure that 
the MGS was “mature enough” for the Government’s ART (PM SBCT, 2006, p. 59).  
The overall purpose of Phase I was to demonstrate improvements to reliability since 
the conclusion of PQT and to validate the expectations of reliability growth.  Phase I, 
ART, consisted of two elements, pre-ART and ART.  The MGS PMO and GDLS 
conducted pre-ART from November 8-18, 2004, and ART from December 2004 to 
June 2005.  ART allowed the MGS PMO and GDLS to develop and validate the 
corrective actions for the system-abort modes that evaluators identified during the 
2003-2004 PQT.   
Phase I also reestablished the MGS baseline, and this served as a starting 
point for the next stage of testing.  The actions taken during Phase I also allowed the 
MGS PMO to review and validate the new reliability growth plan developed by GDLS 
(Fuller, 2004a, November 17, slide 5).  The MGS PMO conditionally accepted the 
GDLS reliability growth plan, which called for monthly updates to MGS stakeholders 
(2004a, November 17, slide 5).  While ART occurred, GDLS conducted a parallel 
effort to select and conduct component-level testing on a new design for the AHS.     
2. Phase II: Systems Engineering Revitalization, Management and Process 
Improvements   
The centerpiece of Phase II was the use of a systems approach to organize 
the program’s available knowledge and tools.  Pragmatically, the MGS PMO and 
GDLS implemented the systems approach through a “revitalized” systems 
engineering plan (PM SBCT, 2006, p. 59).  During Phase II, the MGS PMO and 
GDLS prepared the systems engineering plan for OSD approval in January 2005 
(Fuller, 2004a, November 17, slide 6).  GDLS also dedicated a new team of systems 
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The new systems engineering plan not only addressed the redesign of the 
AHS, but it also addressed the managerial processes that governed daily activities 
within the program (Chang et al., 2009, March, p. 152).  Within GDLS, all of the 
employees assigned to work on the MGS were required to complete a course on 
Whole Systems Architecture and Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis training 
(Josh King, GDLS Stryker Project Engineer, personal communication, March 10, 
2009).  The training provided the employees, who came from a broad range of 
disciplines, with a common operating picture of how GDLS intended to approach 
reliability growth.  The training also ensured that all of the project engineers 
understood how to prioritize failure modes in the design (Josh King, GDLS Stryker 
Project Engineer, personal communication, March 10, 2009).  In a similar manner, 
PM SBCT established a 40-hour course on systems engineering, and this training 
was required for all key staff members (PM SBCT, 2006, p. 34).    
a. MGS Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) 
GDLS reassigned their Senior Director of Product Engineering to be the 
Senior Director of MGS Engineering.  The Senior Director of MGS Engineering 
assumed central control over all MGS engineering decisions, and he reassigned a 
number of key employees to MGS full-time as Integrated Product Team (IPT) leads.  
The MGS PMO and GDLS required every IPT to have a technical manager and a 
lead systems engineer who had responsibility for “risk management, configuration 
management, technical data management, and to control physical and functional 
interfaces across subsystems” (PM SBCT, 2006, p. 42).  GDLS assigned each of 
these IPT Leads to communicate with specific government organizations such as the 
user, materiel developer, and Army testers (Josh King, GDLS Project Engineer, 
personal communication, March 10, 2009).  The Senior Director of MGS Engineering 
also institutionalized a multi-disciplinary IPT meeting structure to improve the flow of 
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In a similar move, the government assigned personnel to each of the IPTs, 
and the MGS PMO reassigned one employee to GDLS on a full-time basis—
allowing him to participate in daily meetings to enhance the collaboration between 
the government and GDLS (see Figure 14) (LTC Erik Webb, personal 
communication, March 10, 2009).  PM SBCT assigned each IPT a charter that 
contained “pre-defined boundaries for decision-making,” and the PM empowered all 
of the IPTs to make decisions at the lowest level possible (PM SBCT, 2006, p. 32).  
PM SBCT also established a set of weekly metrics to review issues, and it made this 
information available to everyone in the program by placing it into a common 
database known as the Integrated Data Environment (2006, p. 34).  The MGS IPT 
metrics measured cost variance, schedule variance, and actual versus planned 
product definition release (2006, p. 35).  Consequently, communications among 
functional areas and between the government and GDLS occurred on a more 
frequent and consistent basis, contributing to a collaborative “team atmosphere” 




















Figure 14. MGS IPT Structure  
(PM SBCT, 2006, p. 31) 
Specific to systems engineering, PM SBCT and GDLS instituted a joint 
Systems Engineering Integration Team (SEIT) with the purpose of coordinating all 
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over 100 systems engineers, and it was “responsible for systems engineering 
technical management, including gate checkpoint reviews, problem management, 
and risk management” (PM SBCT, 2006, p. 36). 
b. Failure Prevention and Review Board and the Design Actions and 
Reporting System   
The MGS PMO and GDLS also instituted a multi-functional team to serve on 
a Failure Prevention and Review Board (FPRB) led by the MGS PMO.  The FPRB 
met twice per week, and the MGS PMO used the FPRB to oversee the Design 
Actions Reporting and Tracking System (DART) and all corrective actions. The 
DART played a critical role in that it managed “the discovered failure modes as well 
as associated corrective actions” (Chang et al., 2009, March, p. 152).   
The DART served as the primary reporting system for the Failure Mode 
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA).  With a relatively small sample size and a 
limited amount of time available for testing, the DART allowed for highly efficient 
identification and correction of failure modes (see Figure 15).  The DART process 
was highly effective, and it reduced the cycle-time for corrective actions on failure 
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Figure 15. Design Actions Reporting and Tracking Process  
(Chang et al., 2009, March, p. 153) 
3. Phase III: Redesign of Major Subsystems and Integration   
The purpose of Phase III was to “demonstrate reliability growth by conducting 
RGT” and to “redesign essential elements of the AHS” (PM SBCT, 2006, p. 60).  On 
October 19, 2004, GDLS selected Western Design’s AHS as the replacement for the 
Aries design.  The new design had a 50% reduction in parts, and it replaced the two 
5-round canisters with one 10-round canister in the carousel.  In the second and 
third quarters of 2005, GDLS conducted systems integration of the Western Design 
AHS into the MGS (Fuller, 2004b, December 20, slide 12).  During this period, GDLS 
conducted a Preliminary Design Review and a Critical Design Review as part of the 
reinvigorated systems engineering process for the new AHS as well as other design 
changes for the MGS (Fuller, 2004b, December 20, slide 13).  Soon thereafter, 
GDLS conducted a short “contractor shakeout” test in June to August 2005, with 
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2008, September, p. 269).  The actual reliability during contractor shakeout was 57 
MRBSA, short of the threshold requirement of 81 (Kim McCormick, GDLS PM MGS, 
personal communication, January 22, 2009).  The MGS PMO determined that the 
Production Verification Test (PVT) would need to serve as an additional reliability 
growth test (Kim McCormick, GDLS PM MGS, personal communication, January 22, 
2009). 
PVT began in May 2006 and finished in April 2008 with three production-like 
vehicles (Chang et al., 2009, March, p. 155).  The actual reliability growth rate 
significantly exceeded the expected growth rate (38% versus 22%), demonstrating 
the effectiveness of the methodology developed in Phase I and II.  The actual 
reliability during PVT was 104 MRBSA, which exceeded the threshold requirement 
(Kim McCormick, GDLS PM MGS, personal communication, January 22, 2009).  
When viewed in comparison to the 13 MRBSA in PQT, the improvement is 
substantial.  It took the crisis of September 2004 to shift the MGS program from a 
series of incremental changes to a dramatic restructuring built around the systems 
approach.   
E. Risk Management Process 
The Stryker acquisition strategy attempted to minimize overall programmatic 
risk by using NDI and “near-NDI” (PM SBCT, 2006, p. 106).  As part of the March 
2000 acquisition strategy, the PM SBCT identified risk on a “top level in terms of 
program cost, schedule, and technical performance to allow informed decision-
making” (PM SBCT, 2006, p. 106).  After the revitalization of the systems 
engineering approach in 2004-2005, PM SBCT integrated risk into the systems 
engineering process with an effort to identify risk from the “bottom up” and from “top 
down perspectives” (PM SBCT, 2006, p. 106).  PM SBCT and GDLS made use of 
the information derived from all collaborative groups to include the IPTs, the systems 
engineering risk team, and a risk review board in identifying risk and developing 
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PM SBCT and GDLS initiated a process in which they formally discussed risk 
at all program reviews and program milestones.  Additionally, PM SBCT and GDLS 
made all risk documentation available to stakeholders on the common IDE database 
(PM SBCT, 2006, p. 107).  While PM SBCT was responsible for oversight of the risk 
management process, GDLS served as the primary manager for technical risk (PM 
SBCT, 2006, p. 106).  PM SBCT and GDLS not only shared risk, but they also used 
a common risk management process that assessed risk on a continuous basis (see 
















































• Mitigate  
Figure 16. PM SBCT Risk Management Process  
(PM SBCT, 2006, p. 106) 
F. Complexity and the MGS 
The literature review in Chapter II demonstrates that there are common 
properties to complex programs.  What makes a program complex is not only the 
internal technical complexity of the system, but also the upstream complexity that 
originates from the outer environment.  Based on this perspective, the MGS certainly 
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While the people who worked on the MGS program were extremely capable 
and dedicated to the program’s success, the MGS still encountered numerous 
difficulties that resulted from organizational, environmental, and technical forces that 
affected the program.  One way to explain the program is by describing it in terms of 
Simon’s model of complexity described in Chapter II.   
The complexity of the outer environment created uncertainty and, in the 
process, increased the MGS program’s overall level of risk.  The MGS program, 
representing the inner environment, was in a search to find an approach to manage 
the complexity and uncertainty that it faced.  The next section addresses the outer 
and inner environments, and it provides an analysis of how the MGS PMO managed 
complexity.     
1. The Outer Environment   
According to Simon (1981) and Kauffman (1993), all complexity originates 
outside of a system, and, in the case of the MGS, the outer environment represents 
all factors that directly and indirectly had an impact on the MGS.  Six risk factors 
stand out in this category, including: 1) the strategic uncertainty of the post-Cold War 
era, 2) time-based acquisition strategy, 3) the unintended consequences of the 
acquisition reforms of the 1990s, 4) the common developmental and non-
developmental acquisition strategy, 5) the categorization of MGS as NDI, and 6) the 
focus on vehicle commonality (see Figure 17).  These risk factors fall under one of 
three areas of criticality based upon information adequacy: 1) known-known, 2) 
unknown-known, and 3) unknown-unknown.  All of these factors are interrelated, but 
the inexact and unknown causality of this relationship is what made the MGS 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 81 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Figure 17. Simon’s Complexity Model Applied to the MGS  
a. Environmental Risk Factors 
At the center of General Shinseki’s ladder of inference was the uncertainty of 
the new multi-polar world.  Unlike the bipolar world, the United States could no 
longer predict with any accuracy the actions of its adversaries.  The post-Cold War 
period demonstrated that the United States required the flexibility of inserting a 
medium-size formation anywhere in the world within 96 hours, with the ability to 
address a continuum of operations ranging from humanitarian aid to major combat.  
The period from 1990-2008 demonstrated that this risk area was clearly positioned 
in the category of an unknown-unknown.  Strategic uncertainty drove the Army’s 
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b. Organizational Risk Factors     
General Eric Shinseki, the champion of the Army’s Transformation strategy, 
understood that this strategy was a long-term endeavor, and Stryker was merely the 
first increment of change.  Beyond the technological challenges of transformation, he 
soberly determined that the single biggest obstacle to Army Transformation was the 
need to overcome the Army’s own byzantine bureaucracy.  As the decisive point of 
the Transformation strategy, he determined that Stryker required a time-based, 
rather than an event-based, strategy to achieve “irreversible momentum” (Shinseki, 
2003).  With a specific date for initial operational capability, this risk factor falls under 
the known-known category.    
In retrospect, a two-year development period for a vehicle that required 
extensive systems integration may seem unreasonable; yet when viewed from the 
assumption that the MGS was close to ready and from the strategic perspective of 
General Shinseki, its rationale seems more apparent.  The March 2000 Acquisition 
Strategy Report for the Interim Armored Vehicle served as the over-arching strategy 
for the developmental and non-developmental IAV variants, but the strategy did not 
adequately address the technical risk associated with the MGS and NBCRV—
particularly with integrating multiple Non-developmental Items and Government-
furnished Equipment in a relatively short time period.  The Acquisition Strategy 
Report for the Interim Armored Vehicle stated in several cases that “limited 
development activity may occur,” and this did not take into account the tremendous 
challenges associated with systems integration (PM BCT, 2000, p. 10).   
As an integrative approach for all program activities, the March 2000 
acquisition strategy was overly focused on the eight production models.  Ultimately, 
this led the program to leave out critical developmental steps such as systems 
integration in the interest of time.  The importance of the systems integration process 
is crucial to risk mitigation because it reveals unpredictable interactions between 
components and validates the technical assumptions.  The acquisition strategy 
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The unintended consequences of the acquisition reforms initiated by Dr. 
William Perry in the 1990s also affected the MGS.  A broad assessment of these 
reforms, particularly the long-term cost savings, is beyond the scope of this case 
study.  The DoD intended to improve the effectiveness and reduce the cycle-time of 
defense acquisitions through the use performance-specification reforms, but, in the 
early stages of their execution, they had the potential to increase the government’s 
level of risk because of the disengagement from the contractor (Yoder, 2004, p. 2).  
While the emphasis on performance-oriented specifications provided the contractor 
with more latitude for innovation, it also created the potential for increased risk if the 
government did not identify an effective verification plan to accompany the 
performance specifications.  The difficulty of obtaining waivers contributed to the 
government’s disengagement from the contractor because the government had to 
put increased faith both in a well-thought-out verification plan that it stipulated in the 
EMD contract, as well as in the engineering approach taken by the contractor.  The 
government wrote the MGS EMD contract with performance-based requirements 
and a nearly complete absence of military specifications and standards; in addition, 
the EMD contract did not call out specific requirements for component-level reliability 
testing with a systems engineering process (N. Jenny Chang, TACOM Reliability 
Engineer, personal communications, March 4, 2008).     
c. Technical Risk Factors 
The outer environment included two technical risk factors that were strongly 
interrelated: 1) the user focus on vehicle commonality and 2) the categorization of 
MGS as NDI.  What made the MGS requirement particularly challenging was the 
user emphasis on commonality.  Individually, the Army could have optimized on 
performance and reliability by developing separate pieces of equipment; however, 
the emphasis on commonality was a new concept, especially given the competing 
requirements of transportability and lethality.  The Army was looking for a common 
vehicle to perform a wide range of tasks; however, the implementation of this 
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the commonality requirement, with its 105mm equipped LAV III that initially 
appeared to be a non-developmental item.   
General Shinseki’s intent was to field a medium-force capability that consisted 
of off-the-shelf solutions.  The emphasis on an off-the-shelf solution was a central 
element of the acquisition reforms of the 1990s described in the organizational risk 
factors.  Although the MGS consisted of NDI components such as the chassis, 
C4ISR equipment, the low profile turret, and the Aries AHS, GDLS did not have an 
integrated solution at the time of the contract award.  The categorization of the MGS 
as NDI was somewhat misleading because it did require significant modification.  
Although the NDI and commonality assumptions caused significant problems during 
development, both of these assumptions were closer to being a known-known rather 
than an unknown-known.  In terms of information adequacy, the design of the time-
based acquisition strategy caused the Army to overemphasize speed.   
2. The Inner Environment   
One can look at the MGS program symbolically as a “box within a box” that 
had to adapt to the risk factors of the dynamic outer environment (Simon, 1981, p. 
148).  The MGS PMO worked in an environment of considerable uncertainty while 
facing a time-based acquisition strategy.  The objective of the inner environment is 
to achieve a sense of resilience or homeostasis.  Through a series of self-organizing 
actions, the MGS PMO attempted to adapt the MGS program to the risk factors of 
the outer environment.   
The new approach consisted of three inseparable elements that enabled the 
MGS program to manage the complex environment: 1) systems approach, 2) error-
embracing behavior, and 3) collaborative learning.  Although the systems approach 
is the decisive effort, it required the complementary effects of the two shaping 
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3. Systems Approach   
The interdependent variables of the outer environment are difficult to separate 
and analyze as snapshots in time.  For this reason, the decisive effort of managing 
complexity is the systems approach.  The systems approach attempts to view the 
entire system in a holistic manner while coordinating people and processes.  The 
problem of uncertainty becomes more difficult with acquisition programs that require 
the rapid integration of technology in a short time period.   
Initially, the program operated under the assumption that the MGS would only 
require limited development.  The MGS program viewed the use of systems 
engineering as either unnecessary or too time-consuming.  As it became 
increasingly evident that the program would not meet the initial schedule and 
performance objectives, the use of systems engineering became a necessity.   
Until 2004, the schedule consisted of a series of tests (PQT) that disproved all 
of the flawed assumptions from the beginning of the program.  Rather than provide 
the Army with a well-integrated system in 2002, GDLS used the “big bang” approach 
to systems integration by piecing together all of the sub-systems at the same time 
(Hyunh, 2008, slide 20).  The systems engineering process adopted by the MGS 
PMO and GDLS revealed that systems integration takes time and requires a 
disciplined process.        
What the MGS PMO clearly understood was that the consequences of 
proceeding down the original trial-and-error approach were clearly not producing the 
desired result.  The area in which this approach demonstrated unmistakable 
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Figure 18. Reliability Growth over Time  
(GDLS, 2009) 
In the trial-and-error approach, the MGS PMO hoped to achieve success 
during a relatively short PQT; however, this was a nearly impossible expectation.  
The implementation of a systems engineering approach played a major role in 
reducing the program’s overall level of risk; in turn, this strengthened the Defense 
Acquisition Board’s (DAB) confidence in the program (Wynne, 2004, p. 2).  In 
complex programs that require personnel from multiple disciplines—such as the 
MGS—the use of systems engineering is critical to address problems from multiple 
perspectives with a holistic perspective.       
4. Collaborative Learning   
When developing a complex system, the effect of social influences—
particularly collaboration—becomes increasingly important because one of the 
primary issues that arises is the lack of communication and knowledge 
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systems engineering process takes social influences into account with its emphasis 
on interdisciplinary collaboration.     
The organizational adaptations to accommodate the reliability growth plan 
(FPRB and DART) demonstrated the need for organizations to be highly proficient at 
monitoring and acting on the rapid flow of information.  The effectiveness of 
collaborative learning demonstrates that the free flow of information is possible if the 
program leadership establishes a culture that identifies and eliminates defensive 
barriers.   
One reason that the MGS PMO and GDLS took hold of collaborative learning 
was that the program reached the crisis point.  Defensive barriers came down, and 
both the MGS PMO and GDLS saw it as an opportunity to get the program on track.  
In this case, the crisis period of late 2004 served as an innovation opportunity for 
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Figure 19. Example of Collaborative Learning  
(GDLS, 2007, slide 5) 
Additionally, complex programs must deal with information that falls under the 
known-known, unknown-known, and unknown-unknown categories.  Risk 
management is practical with known-known and unknown-known information, but it 
is not as effective with unknown-unknown events because these events are almost 
impossible to predict.  That is one reason why it is essential for organizations to 
have a collaborative learning capacity that enables them to adapt to unpredictable 
situations.  The capability for organizations to adapt to ill-structured and 
unpredictable problems makes collaborative learning a critical and complementary 
effort to the systems approach and to error-embracing behavior.  The use of the 
Failure Prevention and Review Board (FPRB) and IPTs demonstrated that reduction 
of cycle-time with the reliability growth is possible through a collaborative and 
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Recognizing the importance of social factors in the implementation of systems 
engineering, the MGS PMO and GDLS realigned their organizations in late 2004 to 
improve their level of collaboration and ability to implement the systems engineering 
process.  However, the systems approach and collaborative learning requires a 
culture in which the program leadership rewards individuals for identifying problems 
and developing integrated solutions.   
5. Systematic Error-embracing Behavior 
An overall strategy that integrates the use of systematic, error-embracing 
behavior with the systems approach and collaborative learning provides a complex 
program with the means of determining how components and sub-systems will 
interact.  Initially, the MGS PMO and GDLS development approach was to 
simultaneously bring many components together and hope that the tests were 
successful.  As it became more apparent that the design was immature, the primary 
method to reduce the knowledge gap between actual and expected performance 
was to seek error-embracing behavior in the form of identifying and correcting failure 
modes.   
The MGS PMO developed a path for reliability growth that started with pre-
ART and concluded with PVT.  The MGS PMO applied the lessons learned from 
PQT by going directly to systems-level testing and then conducting a series of 
component-level tests on the new Western Design AHS and other design 
improvements.  One reason that the reliability growth was so successful in 2005-
2006 was the systematic identification of failure modes.  The MGS PMO and GDLS 
identified failure modes in a small enough scope to diagnose them and develop 
corrective actions in a methodical manner.   
G. Conclusion 
To the outside observer, it may seem as though the Army and GDLS did not 
exercise enough due diligence with the development of the MGS.  In retrospect, that 
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difficulty in making objective comparisons across multiple options while trying to 
figure out the consequences of those decisions (Simon, 1979, September, p. 502).  
In Judgment Under Uncertainty, Tversky and Kahneman also discussed this concept 
when they said, “People rely on [a] limited number of heuristic principles, which 
reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler 
judgmental operations.  In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes 
they lead to severe or systematic errors” (1974, September 27, p. 1124). 
A perfect adaptation to the outer environment is nearly impossible for many 
reasons but mainly because the decision-makers, the MGS PMO in this case, were 
operating under uncertainty.  To make the best decisions possible, the decision-
makers needed as much fact-based information as possible to establish their 
baseline.  With the MGS, the Army initiated the program with imperfect information 
based on inaccurate assumptions in the interest of time.  The future occurrence of a 
similar situation is preventable if the lessons learned are properly absorbed.   
There is no simple answer to a root-cause analysis on the troubled 
development period of the MGS from 2001-2008.  It seems evident that the Army 
and GDLS satisficed in their development strategy to meet the time-to-market 
requirements.  Moving beyond the actual system reliability, this case study examined 
the structure of processes to determine how an overestimation of the system 
reliability occurred.     
In effect, the government made decisions early on about the length of the 
schedule and the test approach that did not reflect the technical status of the 
system, and the government anchored these decisions on inaccurate assumptions 
about the MGS.  In retrospect, it appears that the Army started off with a tendency 
for unwarranted optimism that the MGS PMO and GDLS could field the system on 
the original schedule.  That optimism did not take into account the lessons that time-
to-market is not free and that systems integration takes time.  The last two chapters 
demonstrated that a rigorous and well-resourced systems engineering process is the 
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All of this points to the need for organizations to deal with uncertainty, 
particularly within complex systems.  Within defense acquisition, the solution to a 
problem is not only dependent upon the objective information provided to the 
decision-maker but also upon the type of process that the decision-maker uses.  A 
decision-maker must determine what he or she knows about a system and must 
then determine how much information is sufficient, given the availability of time and 
resources.  The next chapter addresses the lessons learned from the MGS case 
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VI.  Conclusion and Lessons Learned 
A. Introduction  
One of the stated goals of the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) is to 
provide users with “effective, affordable, and timely systems” that are developed in 
“response to an approved need” (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2003a).  The 
Army provides program managers with a charter to field these systems given cost, 
schedule and performance constraints while navigating a complex environment.  
The difficulty in fielding systems stems from the complex environment found in the 
defense acquisition system.  The environment is complex because of the difficulty in 
determining how the risk factors are interrelated.  Environments that encounter a 
greater degree of complexity and uncertainty will also experience an increase in their 
overall level of program risk.  The MGS case study attempts to document how one 
program managed that complex environment.      
“Manage” is the key term because program managers cannot eliminate 
uncertainty and complexity, but they can manage it, if they have an adequate 
strategy in place.  In Embracing Uncertainty, Clampitt and DeKoch (2001) describe 
five methods for creating certainty that include gut instincts, experiences, reasoning,  
and testing (p. 47).  Yet, in their analysis, they debunk the notion that one can 
eliminate uncertainty in decision-making (Clampitt and DeKoch, 2001, p. 28).  In The 
Fifth Discipline, Senge discusses the misleading notion that effective managers must 
have an omniscient picture of what is occurring around them at all times when he 
said, “[I]t is simply unacceptable for managers to act as though they do not know 
what is causing a problem […] Those intent on reaching such positions learn early 
on to develop an air of confident authority” (2007, p. 234).   
This case study makes it evident that charting a course of certainty in all but 
the most simple acquisition programs is not possible given the tremendously 
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experienced complexity in terms of organization, environment, and technology.  It is 
no surprise that program managers frequently use the cliché “it depends” when 
describing a solution to a problem.  The program manager does not base his or her 
response on a scientific analysis of the problem, but, rather, the program manager 
bases the response on years of observing unpredictable interactions between 
complex events.     
Although the pursuit of absolute certainty is a quixotic program objective, a 
more pragmatic objective for program managers is the management of complexity.  
What follows is a restatement of this case study’s research question, a discussion of 
the core findings, and a modest list of lessons learned.                   
B. Research Problem 
The primary research problem was to find a significant developmental 
problem experienced with the MGS and then to analyze the root causes of the 
problem as well as the corrective actions taken by the MGS Product Management 
Office (MGS PMO).  Parallel to this effort, this case study explored complexity theory 
to determine if it was applicable to the MGS program.  After conducting the analysis, 
this case study attempted to draw insights on how the MGS program managed 
complexity and then to determine what lessons could be applied to other acquisition 
programs.   
C. Findings and Application 
1. Findings 
The Army planned to acquire the MGS under an accelerated, time-based 
acquisition strategy.  However, the acquisition strategy did not achieve the early 
fielding of the MGS, which was one of the Army’s primary objectives.  The 
acquisition strategy is the “high level business and technical management approach 
designed to achieve program objectives within required resource constraints” 
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difficulties encountered in transitioning from the early MGS variants to the production 
version.   
The Army took a number of steps to mitigate program risk to accommodate 
the time-based acquisition strategy.  In 1999, the Army conducted a Platform 
Performance Demonstration (PPD) to determine the “state of the art,” and it used the 
information gained from the PPD to refine the requirements and develop the 
Request for Proposal (RFP).  The Army also mandated that the MGS use NDI 
components to limit the amount of development required.   
Despite the steps taken to reduce programmatic risk, the MGS still required a 
considerable amount of development.  It was not until 2002 that the Army realized 
there was a gap between the expected or anticipated performance of the MGS and 
its actual performance.  The early MGS variants were less technically mature than 
anticipated, and this required additional time for development and testing.   
What makes the MGS program interesting as a case study was the rate of 
improvement in the MGS reliability after the strategic approach changed.  This case 
study used the MGS reliability problems as a microcosm for analyzing how a 
contemporary acquisition program self-organized to increase its adaptation to 
complexity.  During the crisis period of 2004-2005, the MGS PMO adopted a 
systems approach complemented by error-embracing behavior and collaborative 
learning.   
The systems approach adopted by the MGS PMO and GDLS improved the 
capacity of the program to self-organize when the complex environment around the 
program was constantly changing.  The MGS PMO realized that the technical 
progress of the vehicle was out of alignment with the acquisition strategy, and it took 
steps to redefine the strategy through the integration of the systems approach, error-
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Based on the information available, the case study concluded that intensive 
programmatic crises occur when an acquisition strategy does not adequately 
synchronize critical program activities such as risk management, systems 
engineering, test and evaluation, contract management, and integrated 
product/process development.  These factors strongly correlate to the success 
factors that are associated with the actions taken by the MGS PMO and GDLS (see 
Figure 20).   
 
Figure 20. MGS PMO Strategic Approach  
Programs that embrace a systems approach complemented by error-
embracing behavior and collaborative learning are capable of accepting greater 
degrees of risk associated with uncertainty and complexity.  These concepts are not 
new.  In fact, defense acquisition doctrine has a deep and broad array of explicit 
knowledge available to acquisition programs that discusses these concepts, but it is 
unclear how of much of this doctrine is adhered to.  Furthermore, it is unclear if 
lessons learned from other programs such as the Army’s Sergeant York air defense 
system, the Navy’s T-45 flight trainer, and the Army’s Armed Reconnaissance 
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2. A Strategic Approach is Necessary to Manage Complexity 
External and internal complexity results in increased downstream levels of 
uncertainty for acquisition programs.  Managing uncertainty is possible through 
continuous strategic planning that ascertains the level of information available from 
the environment and integrates program activities to achieve objectives while 
recognizing resource constraints.  Over time, the problems caused by complexity will 
change, and the program manager must make corresponding adjustments to the 
strategy.  Between 2000 and 2006, the MGS PMO self-organized to improve the 
alignment and fit of its strategic activities (see Figure 21).   
 
Figure 21. MGS Acquisition Strategy Alignment over Time  
How does a program manager proactively determine his/her strategic 
approach?  It is essential to point out that acquisition strategy is not a static program 
document that the program manager updates at key milestones.  Rather, acquisition 
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elements of his or her program, while recognizing the risk and uncertainty in the 
complex environment.   
The key elements of an acquisition strategy will not align by default.  Rather, 
self-organization is an adaptation to complexity that requires significant effort and 
foresight.  The program manager should start with the program’s internal and 
external goals, and then align the program’s activities to fit those goals.  After 
achieving some alignment, the program manager will need to reinforce the fit 
between elements.  Therefore, the program manager must often take on the roles of 
an orchestrator and synchronizer.         
3. Integration of Strategic Activities   
The difference in program outcome could originate from the program 
manager’s ability to develop an acquisition strategy that adapts to the environment 
through the alignment and fit of its strategic activities.  The acquisition strategy 
should serve as a means to coordinate the work of all individuals who work for or 
with the program.  As a dynamic planning document, it should ensure that the 
program’s activities reinforce one another and are consistent.     
With acquisition strategy, the whole matters more than any individual activity.  
At the core of strategic planning for acquisition programs is the alignment of these 
five elements: integrated product/process development, risk management systems 
engineering, test and evaluation, and contract management.  There is no cookie-
cutter approach or template for strategy implementation because each case is 
unique.  When properly tailored to a common strategic vision, these activities 
become powerful tools to manage complexity.  
a. Integrated Product/Process Development (IPPD) 
The use of Integrated Product/Process Development provides the 
overarching linkage between the strategic activities because it enables collaborative 
learning and cross-functional communication.  A key element of IPPD is the use of 
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essential because each stakeholder provides a unique frame of reference and set of 
assumptions.  Within the acquisition strategy, the program manager must properly 
orient and challenge the IPTs towards program objectives and empower them to 
reduce defensive barriers between functions and organizations (DSMC, 1999, p. 2-
3).   
An IPT system and a program culture that emphasize collaborative learning 
will also help a program adapt to unknown-unknown risk factors.  Unknown-unknown 
events can strike a program without warning, and a program’s ability to quickly 
adapt, learn, and develop collaborative solutions provides the most effective means 
to adapt to this type of risk factor. The IPTs serve as the facilitators of all strategic 
activities for the program.        
b. Risk Management  
The risk management process is dependent upon the program’s IPTs 
because the program requires multiple perspectives for risk identification.  The DoD 
Risk Management Guide clearly states that risk identification is the responsibility of 
all members of the IPT, and it does not solely rest with the program manager or with 
the lead systems engineer (DoD, August, 2006, p. 7).  The identification of risk 
encompasses all aspects of the acquisition program, to include organizational, 
environmental, and technological aspects.  Risk management incorporates the 
concept of feed-forward, which Herbert Simon discussed as a key element of self-
organization in The Sciences of the Artificial (1981, p. 44).   
The MGS program demonstrated that a limited self-organization is possible in 
the midst of a crisis, but this approach requires a substantial commitment of 
resources and, most importantly, organizational support.  While there is no way to 
anticipate all risk, the program manager should ensure that the acquisition strategy 
integrates the risk management process with the systems engineering process.  A 
risk management process that identifies risk from both the bottom up and top down 
will help a program manager anticipate problems before they occur and achieve 
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c. Systems Engineering 
Risk management is a key element of DoD acquisition doctrine that 
complements the systems engineering process.  Like acquisition strategy, systems 
engineering covers all aspects of the program, but it primarily supports the 
acquisition strategy by establishing a common approach to the coordination of multi-
disciplinary activities and processes.   
The use of the systems engineering process enables the program to develop 
a holistic view of development.  The systems engineering process provides the 
overall plan that integrates both technical and business aspects of the program.  
Like the other strategic activities, the systems engineering process is dependent 
upon the program’s IPTs for the dissemination and interpretation of information.  
Timely and accurate decisions also depend upon accurate snapshot assessments of 
a system through test and evaluation.   
d. Test and Evaluation 
Test and evaluation is the program manager’s best method of determining the 
program’s actual technical status.  Test and evaluation supports the acquisition 
strategy by assisting the program manager with revealing technical unknowns, which 
reduces the program’s overall level of risk.  A program that establishes a culture in 
which test and evaluation is an error-embracing process will view failures as critical 
to the learning process and continuous improvement.  Therefore, error-embracing 
behavior should not take the form of a go/no-go or pass/fail test because this 
mindset will inevitably lead to unintended consequences.  These consequences may 
include hiding bad results or limiting the scope of testing.  All of the stakeholders, 
including the contractor, should take the perspective that embracing relevant failures 
will ultimately lead to an improved design that meets the user’s needs.      
e. Contract Management 
Contract management supports acquisition strategy by shaping the 
contractor’s behavior to achieve the program’s objectives.  It is also dependent upon 
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contractor properly share risk.  When planned and executed properly, contract 
management ensures that the processes used by the government and contractor 
are synchronized.  Contract management is also the most tangible means of 
communicating the program manager’s strategic intent to the contractor.  The 
program manager should also ensure that all of the program’s IPTs include a 
contract representative so that the contract can adapt to any changes to the 
environment in a timely manner.     
D. Lessons Learned 
What follows is a short discussion of lessons learned and recommendations 
gleaned from this case study on MGS and its use of NDI.  The inclusion of particular 
actions in these lessons and recommendations does not necessarily imply their 
absence or failure in the MGS program.  Due to time and space constraints, the 
case study could not address all aspects of the program.  Regardless, the intent of 
the lessons learned and recommendations is not to list what went wrong with the 
MGS, but rather to use the benefit of hindsight in a constructive manner and 
disseminate actionable items that are useful for any acquisition program.        
1. To manage complexity, a program requires an acquisition 
strategy that is adaptable to the changes in the external and internal 
environment.       
a.   Discussion: Complexity originates from outside of an acquisition 
program and each element of complexity interacts and influences a program through 
multiple risk factors.  By itself, a risk factor may not pose a problem, but when 
multiple risk factors interact, a disaster may result.  The central issue with complexity 
is uncertainty.  Program management offices that find themselves caught in the 
cauldron of fire-fighting problems with a crisis management approach have lost the 
initiative.  From 2002 to 2004, the MGS program demonstrated a fire-fighting 
mentality in reaction to a number of developmental problems that included reliability 
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inadequate acquisition strategy, which did not address the risk factors specific to the 
MGS.   
The ultimate objective of a program is to field a system, but this requires the 
program manager to create an acquisition strategy that can manage a broad 
continuum of uncertainty.  The MGS PMO was able to reestablish the initiative after 
reinvigorating their systems engineering process through effective error-embracing 
behavior and collaborative learning.  One factor that allowed this to occur was the 
institutional support that the MGS had from the user.  
b. Recommendations:  
 Program managers should develop and empower a strong IPPD 
because shared perspectives and interpretations across disciplines 
and processes is the key to managing complexity.  Program managers 
should conduct periodic assessments of the operating environment 
assumptions and risk factors with key stakeholders.   
 Program managers should dedicate blocks of time on a recurring basis 
for a review of their program’s strategy.  Program managers should 
dedicate one day two times per year to discuss the program’s 
acquisition strategy.  The program manager should discuss a 
component or activity of the acquisition strategy on a monthly basis as 
an action item. 
 Program managers should form an informal Tiger Team or group of 
advisers to challenge program acquisition strategy.  Program 
managers should form a diverse group in an informal advisory role to 
meet periodically to discuss how a program’s strategy is meeting its 
objectives.  The purpose of this group is to challenge and question the 
program manager in an effort to improve the resilience and quality of 
the strategy. 
 Acquisition strategy should focus on synchronization of activities.  
Beyond discussing strategic activities such as systems engineering, 
risk management, test and evaluation, contract management, and 
IPPD as separate events, the acquisition strategy should describe how 
the program should synchronize activities to achieve program 
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 Program managers should communicate the program’s acquisition 
strategy continuously to allow for greater decentralized decision-
making capacity and alignment of program objectives.   
 During Acquisition Planning, program managers should include the 
acquisition strategy with the Request for Proposal (RFP) to increase 
the contractor’s awareness of the program’s approach. 
2. Systems integration is always something new, and the effort it 
requires is frequently underestimated.  The materiel developer should allot 
adequate time for systems integration during its development.  
a. Discussion: During its initial development period, the MGS PMO and 
GDLS did not use an adequate systems engineering process.  One consequence 
was that the program did not have a clear picture of the technology readiness of the 
MGS Mission Equipment Package (MEP), particularly the ammunition handling 
system.  The MGS required the integration of several major components, including 
the low profile turret, the 105mm main gun, the ammunition handling system, and 
the fire control system.  The MGS MEP was less technically mature than the MGS 
PMO anticipated, and this contributed to schedule delays and more testing.  The 
MGS PMO soon determined that the integration of the major components required a 
more robust systems engineering process.      
b. Recommendations   
 During acquisition planning, the program manager should establish a 
Systems Engineering IPT (SEIPT) to oversee all technical planning.  
After awarding the contract, the SEIPT should become the Systems 
Engineering Integration Team that works across all IPTs to address 
technical aspects of the system. 
 Prior to publishing the RFP, the program manager should ensure the 
program identifies potential high-risk requirements and/or Work 
Breakdown Structure components. 
 During Source Selection, the government should prioritize the 
contractor’s technical capabilities, particularly systems engineering, 
under Section M of the RFP, Evaluation Factors.  Additionally, the 
government should ensure that it uses a highly experienced lead 
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 The program manager should state within the Statement of Objectives 
(SOO) or Statement of Work (SOW) that the contractor’s systems 
engineering processes must be compatible with the government’s 
processes.        
 The SOW/SOO should mandate the use of an integrated 
government/contractor configuration management process.  Each 
engineering change can potentially trigger new problems.  With 
engineers from multiple organizations working on the system, the 
program manager should emplace a disciplined configuration 
management plan that allows the program to diagnose problems 
during systems integration. 
 The program manager should make the contractor’s systems 
engineering plan a Contract Data Requirement List (CDRL) item. 
 If the system requires development, then the RFP should require an 
assessment of technical readiness levels and integration readiness 
levels down to the third or fourth level of the Work Breakdown 
Structure.   
 The DoD should augment the Technical Readiness Assessment with 
an independent Integration Readiness Assessment.  The Integration 
Readiness Assessment should provide a measureable Integration 
Readiness Level (IRL) that assists with determining the effort required 
for systems integration. 
 Program managers should approach systems integration as a bottom-
up activity.  Program managers should embrace a technical approach 
that integrates components on a small enough scale so that the 
program can discover problems as early as possible with sufficient 
time to diagnose them.     
3. The program manager should integrate a top-down/bottom-up 
risk management process with the systems engineering process.    
a. Discussion: Uncertainty is the fundamental problem for acquisition 
programs, and much of this uncertainty comes from the unpredictable interaction of 
risk factors.  Program managers should not underestimate the importance of risk 
management, particularly in the early stages of a program.  Systems engineering 
provides an integrated and multi-disciplinary approach to address a range of 
elements from the external continuum of factors, and a program should accompany 
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Management Guide for DoD Acquisition clearly summarizes this idea, “Additionally, 
risk management is most effective if it is fully integrated with the program's systems 
engineering and program management processes—as a driver and a dependency 
on those processes for root cause and consequence management” (DAU, August, 
2006, p. 1). 
Like the systems approach, risk management requires collaborative learning 
not only between the government and the contractor, but also with other key 
stakeholders such as the test and user communities.  The ability to absorb a broad 
range of risk requires the program manager to anticipate problems, many of which 
fall into the unknown-known category.  With unknown-known information, someone 
in the program may have the information that the program manager needs for a 
decision.  Therefore, it is essential that the risk management process use both a top-
down and a bottom-up approach to risk identification.   
In hindsight, it appears that the Army did not effectively employ a bottom-up 
risk management process at the beginning of the MGS program.  Two potential 
reasons stand out for this shortfall.  First, the MGS PMO did not have adequate 
staffing to conduct the risk management process given their involvement in the 
Interim Armored Vehicle source selection.  Second, the IPT structure was not fully 
functional early in the program.     
b. Recommendations  
 The program manager should incentivize the contractor to integrate its 
risk management process with the government’s process.  The 
integrated risk management process between the government and the 
contractor should collaborate as much as possible on information and 
common metrics.   
 The program manager should ensure that the contractor’s risk 
management plan is a CDRL item, and that program integrates it with 
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 Government PMOs should empower the contractor throughout the risk 
management process in order to share risk and take ownership of the 
process.    
 The PMO should ensure that the Risk Management IPT has a written 
charter that it supports with Memorandums of 
Understanding/Agreement between other governmental 
organizations/agencies and that it codifies within the contract. 
 The program manager should establish a risk management coordinator 
who works with the program’s IPTs to identify risk.  The risk 
management coordinator should assist the program manager with the 
risk management process. 
 The program manager should ensure that the lead systems engineer 
reviews the risk mitigation plans, and the PMO should routinely update 
these plans.  The program manager and lead systems engineer should 
carefully review the mitigation plan to determine the potential impact to 
other parts of the program. 
 The PMO should run a Risk Management Board on a recurring basis 
to review the risk management process and advise the program 
manager on risk. 
 Programs should make identified risks available to all stakeholders on 
a shared and collaborative database to improve risk visibility and 
program transparency.   
4. The integration of multiple NDI/COTS components will likely 
increase programmatic complexity.  Program managers should carefully 
review the risks associated with materiel solutions that require the integration 
of NDI/COTS.   
a. Discussion: During the contract award briefing, LTG Kern, the Source 
Selection Authority stated: 
The mobile gun system takes a 105mm cannon which we already have and 
integrates it into the LAV chassis with a turret. And so off-the-shelf, in the 
context that we are speaking of, it means that there are integration efforts 
required for development, but we aren't designing new guns, sights, or sensor 
packages for this equipment. (Federal News Service, 2000)  
A common misconception is that the use of NDI/COTS components 
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carefully consider the risks associated with NDI/COTS.  The IAV acquisition strategy 
mandated the use of NDI/COTS to reduce the technical risk (PM SBCT, 2006, p. 
106; PM BCT, 2000, p. 8).  With the MGS, the integration of multiple NDI/COTS 
increased the technical complexity because none of these components was plug- 
and-play, and all required modification.   
Unless a system is immediately ready for fielding, meaning that it is truly off-
the-shelf and immediately available, it will frequently require some level of 
development.  The MGS proved that systems integration is unpredictable.  Yet, a 
time-based acquisition strategy requires a much greater degree of certainty than the 
more typical event-based acquisition strategies.  Applying a time-based strategy to a 
program that requires system development may successfully induce a greater sense 
of urgency, but it still imposes an arbitrary deadline on system fielding that does not 
reflect reality.   
b. Recommendations      
 During acquisition planning, the program manager should thoroughly 
conduct market research on NDI/COTS and carefully consider the 
trade-offs required in test and evaluation and schedule.  Analyzing 
these factors will help the PM reduce risk.   
 Program managers should verify the contractor’s test and evaluation 
processes for NDI/COTS prior to contract award.  Government 
verification of contractor testing is necessary because the contractor 
testing may not replicate the item’s performance in a combat 
environment, and it may not replicate the military’s intended use of the 
item.   
 If the item is purely NDI or COTS, then the program manager should 
place the preponderance of contractual risk onto the contractor since 
the system is technically mature. 
 The program manager should ensure that the contract SOW or SOO 
clearly describes the means of verification for performance 
specifications.  Program managers should consult with multiple 
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 The PMO should ensure that it receives the Technical Data Package 
for all NDI to improve flexibility with systems integration, future 
upgrades, and logistical sustainment. 
 Programs should avoid combining developmental and non-
developmental variants under the same acquisition strategy.  
Programs that require a developmental effort need a unique acquisition 
strategy that necessitates a different set of trade-offs in cost, schedule, 
and performance.  
 After verifying the contractor’s testing process for NDI/COTS, the 
government should tailor the test and evaluation process around 
conditions not addressed by the contractor. 
5. The materiel developer, user, contractor, and test and evaluation 
communities should develop a culture of error-embracing behavior as the 
centerpiece of effective test and evaluation.   
a. Discussion: During the early stages of MGS delivery in 2002 and PQT 
in 2003, it became apparent that the ammunition handling system had significant 
problems, yet the Army did not verify these problems until much later in PQT (LTC 
Shane Fullmer, personal communication, February 27, 2009).  Ultimately, the Army 
did not fully address these problems until late 2004—almost two years later.  After 
the MGS PMO placed a high priority on improving the reliability of the MGS MEP, 
the test program achieved disciplined flexibility.  When it became apparent that 
additional reliability growth was necessary, the PMO adjusted the Production 
Verification Test to allow for greater Reliability Growth Testing.  The approach of 
disciplined flexibility allowed the PMO to address reliability shortcomings. 
Error-embracing behavior goes beyond test and evaluation because it 
requires an aggressive organizational drive to find and root out system failures.  A 
variation of this lesson learned is to confront the brutal facts as early as possible and 
to reduce the tendency to make less of problems.  Clearly, test and evaluation is a 
continuous part of the systems engineering process, and it is a means of resolving 
whether the actual performance is meeting the expected performance.  Error-
embracing behavior is an attitude that discovery of test failures is desirable because 
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b. Recommendations 
 The program’s test and evaluation strategy should complement the 
acquisition strategy by uncovering as many technical unknowns as 
possible.  The structure of the test and evaluation strategy should 
provide the program manager with incremental amounts of information 
that will lead to improved decision-making.   
 The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) should allow for 
flexibility.  If the government believes that a particular component, 
particularly a critical element of a Mission Equipment Package, is 
inadequate, then the test program should address the problem as soon 
as possible.   
 The Measures of Suitability outlined in the TEMP should adequately 
reflect the Operational Mission Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP) 
and they should provide a direct measurement of reliability, particularly 
for critical, high-risk components.   
 Program managers should have incentive systems, both internal and 
external to the program, to create a culture in which the early 
identification of problems and issues is highly encouraged. 
 Program managers should implement event-based test and evaluation 
that reflects the anticipated maturity of the system.  Programs must 
verify the effectiveness and suitability of individual components before 
moving onto system-level testing. 
6. Inadequate early and continuous planning for reliability leads to 
longer acquisition cycle-times and higher lifecycle costs.   
a. Discussion: The MGS program experienced a crisis period in 2004-
2005 primarily because the reliability of the Mission Equipment Package fell short of 
the user’s requirements.  The poor reliability was the result of an abbreviated 
systems integration process and a test and evaluation process that did not reveal 
reliability problems early enough.  The MGS is not alone in demonstrating 
inadequate reliability, and one Army Test and Evaluation Command study of 
defense systems demonstrated that only 20% of the systems that underwent 
operational reliability testing from 1996-2000 met the reliability requirements (DoD, 
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After attempting a test for reliability approach in 2003, the MGS PMO 
developed a design for reliability approach in 2004-2005.  Additionally, the MGS 
PMO and GDLS implemented an improved Reliability Growth Testing process that 
incorporated a better tracking system for failure modes and a faster implementation 
of corrective actions.  The MGS PMO and GDLS also integrated a design for 
reliability approach with the systems engineering process.      
b. Recommendations 
 During acquisition planning, the government should conduct an 
adequate engineering analysis of items identified during market 
research to determine the extent of integration required and the 
potential impact on system reliability. 
 The program manager should utilize the TRL/IRL assessment as an 
indicator of a potential problem with design for reliability.  The TRL/IRL 
assessment should trigger an early focus on component-level testing. 
 Within the RFP, the program manager should include a Reliability 
Program Plan (RPP) that discusses the requirements for reliability and 
design for reliability approach.  The RPP should require the contractor 
to provide a conversion of the reliability performance stated in the 
Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP) and Failure 
Definition/Scoring Criteria (FD/SC) to detailed specifications (Chang et 
al., 2009, p. 153).  The RPP should also document the organizational 
roles and responsibilities for reliability activities, and the procedures for 
verifying reliability requirements—to include contingency plans for 
improving reliability (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(A&T), 2009, p. 30).   
 Future programs should adopt a design for reliability approach.  If the 
program adopts an off-the-shelf system that requires systems 
integration, then the program manager should incorporate design for 
reliability into the systems engineering and test and evaluation plans 
because it will ultimately reduce the total ownership cost.   
 The program manager should ensure the use of a closed-loop 
reporting system.  The closed-loop reporting system ensures that the 
developer can properly record, track, and correct failure modes.  The 
formation of a Failure Prevention and Review Board (FPRB) ensures 
that the developer can identify and address failure modes in a timely 
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E. Recommendations for Further Research 
1. During the MGS development, requirements changes occurred, 
starting in 2004.  These requirements changes resulted in several Configuration 
Steering Boards (CSBs).  The purpose of the Configuration Steering Board is to 
serve as an oversight committee that reviews requirements changes that have the 
potential of causing cost or schedule changes to ACAT I programs (Young, 2007).  
Research is necessary to determine the root cause of the requirements changes and 
how the MGS PMO addressed the challenge.  How does a program, like MGS, 
establish requirements discipline and limit configuration changes? 
2. Do contemporary acquisition programs properly align their strategic 
activities?  Do these programs use the systems engineering, risk management, test 
and evaluation, contact management and IPPD processes in a complementary and 
reinforcing manner? 
3. Overcoming obstacles in the development effort can cause 
considerable delays and, depending upon their size and priority, can also increase 
the program’s cost.  Contractors are success-oriented and are anxious for the 
government to fully adopt their proposals and design solutions.  The contractor has a 
natural tendency to make less of a developmental problem.  How does the 
government, which is typically understaffed, diagnose the judgment of the 
contractors to determine the actual maturity of a system at the beginning of system 
development or during source selection?  Does the government currently have the 
resources, including human capital, to conduct this effort? 
4. One option for programs that require a time-based approach is to 
conduct a non-linear approach to system development, in which the materiel 
developer, contractor, user, and the test community collaboratively agree under the 
auspices of the DoD to conduct parallel efforts.  In the case of MGS, this might 
include building additional prototypes to allow for a broader test effort.  The broader 
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occur in sequence.  While this process would be more chaotic and “messier” to 
manage, it might reduce the cycle-time of development.  Such an effort would 
require multiple waivers from the DoD as well as sufficient resources early on.   Has 
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